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I. INTRODUCTION: CLIMATE CHANGE WILL STRESS BOTH
REGIONS AND WATER LAW
A. AUF WIEDERSEHEN TO HYDRO STATIONARITY
In the coming decades, Global Climate Change (GCC) will impact
hydrologic balances and thus water availability, use, and management
in both arid and humid regions of the United States.. Many of the
fundamental hydrologic assumptions underlying water allocation,
water pollution control, and aquatic ecosystem conservation will
fundamentally change. GCC will therefore stress both the laws of
prior appropriation and riparian rights.' Water law follows hydrology
and assumes that regional water balances will remain relatively
constant or "stationary" over time; however, this assumption is no
longer viable.'
Water managers must now assume that existing.
hydrologic models are no longer reliable and in many cases lead to an
underestimation of available supplies.5 The end of stationarity will
2. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
AND WATER 3-4 (Bryson Bates et al. eds., 2008); COMM. ON THE ENV'T & NATURAL RES.,
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 12- 13 (2008); COMM. ON STABILIZATION TARGETS FOR
ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE
STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO

MILLENNIA (forthcoming 2010) (concluding that each one degree Celsius rise will
reduce rain in the southwest by 5-10%).
3. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon
Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 68-71 (2010),
available at http://lawlibrary.unm.edu/nrj/50/1/02_AbramsHall.pdf; Robert W.
Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 10-18
(2010); Brian E. Gray, Global Climate Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management
Opportunities, 14 HASTINGS W.-NwJ. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1453, 1454-55 (2008); Kathleen
A. Miller, Climate Change and Water in the West: Complexities, Uncertainties, and Strategies
for Adaptation, 27J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 87, 91 (2007).
4. See Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity is Dead"-Long Live Transformation: Five
Principlesfor Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2010);
Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (2008).
5. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING

COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY

MANAGEMENT:
73-92 (2007)

(summarizing the studies of the potential impact of warmer temperatures in the
Colorado River Basin). It observes that the most scenarios predict modest stream
flow decreases but "[a]ny future decreases in the Colorado River stream flow . . .
would be especially troubling because the quantity of water allocations under the Law
of the River already exceeds the amount of the mean annual mean Colorado River
Flows"), id at 92.
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create new conflicts between present right holders and future
claimants and between consumptive and non-consumptive, especially
environmental, uses. The hard question is how the law and those
charged with applying it and managing water within its framework
should react to this new, even more, uncertain world.
Climate change response strategies are divided into two separate
categories: mitigation and adaptation. The first question is whether
to place one's faith in mitigation or adaptation. Mitigation attempts
to stabilize or roll back greenhouse gas emissions.6 Adaptation is
defined as an action that either reduces "an area's vulnerability to the
negative impacts of climate change" or enhances "its ability to capture
any benefits."' Adaptation proceeds from one of two assumptions,
although the consequences are the same. First, the "real politick"
assumption is that serious, as opposed to band-aid or feel-good,
mitigation will not occur. The failure of the 2009 Copenhagen
Summit 8 and the failure of the United States Congress to enact any
climate change or energy legislation even after the 2010 Gulf of
Mexico oil spill confirm this assumption.9 Second, the "leap of faith"
assumption is that mitigation strategies will be implemented, but the
benefits will not kick in for at least a century and possibly a
millenniumio-a very Keynesian long run. Both assumptions lead to
the conclusion that for the foreseeable future water managers have no
choice but to take the various GCC risk scenarios as a given and ask
6. See Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a Global
Problem, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 360 (2010).
7. Id. at 362. (quoting NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 458
(2007)). See also Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change:
Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 Emory L.J 1, 17-23 (2010)
(distinguishing between reactive and proactive, direct and indirect, and procedural
and substantive measures).
8. See Tobias Rapp et al., How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit,
DER SPIELGEL May 05, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/
See also GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL
world/0,1518,692861,00.html.
CHANGE [WBGU], POLICY PAPER NO. 6, CLIMATE POLICY POST-COPENHAGEN: A THREELEVEL STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS 5 (2010) ("[Copenhagen Accord,] even if honored in
full . . . fall[s] short of what is required to limit the increase of the global mean
temperature to 2 degrees Celsius . .. ." ).
9. FredericJ. Fronimer, Gulf Spill Lacks Societal Punch of Santa Barbara,ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 29, 2010, availableat http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/wireStory?id=11275571. Any predictions about the course of energy policy
are extremely risky, but the contrast between the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, which
triggered the modem environmental movement and the first generation of
environmental legislation, and 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, which has triggered nothing
nationally except a Presidential commission, is instructive. Of course, the 2010 Spill
may have longer-term impacts.
10. Richard Monastersky, A Burden Beyond Bearing, 458 NATURE 1091, 1092 (2009);
GAS
ON
STABILIZATION TARGETS FOR ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE
COMM.
CONCENTRATIONS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 1. The latest research

suggests that we are reaching dangerous C02 concentrations more quickly than
previous estimations and that the recovery time from reductions, should they actually
occur, may be as much as a 1,000 years. See generally GARY BRAASCH, EARTH UNDER
FIRE: How GLOBAL WARMING IS CHANGING THE WORLD (2007) (providing more
information on Global warming recovery times).
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how those potentially impacted can take steps to reduce the adverse
This
impacts through changes in water use and management."
article assumes that water users and managers have no choice but to
adapt because the adverse impacts will manifest themselves long
before mitigation kicks in if at all and focuses on the capacity of water
quantity law to adapt to GCC, although it recognizes that lower net
streamflows can also undermine pollution control standards and
discharge permit conditions.
B. Do WE REALLY KNOW ANYTHING USEFUL?

Climate change is a scientific hypothesis. The science is a
combination of sophisticated models augmented by the increasing
scientific evidence that anthropocentric change is beginning to
There is a
manifest itself in concrete ways around the world."
relatively firm consensus that arid and semiarid regions risk the net
loss of stream runoff as winter snowpack diminishes and spring and
summer evaporation increases." In all regions, there is an increased
risk of decreased production from thermal and hydroelectric power
plants. 4 As a result, federal and state carry-over storage projects may
not be able to meet their contractual delivery obligations in growing,
water-stressed areas." Predictions are cloudiet for more humid areas,
but there is little doubt that climate change will occur. Many areas in
the East may experience intense bursts of increased runoff that will
cause severe flood events, at the same time, these areas may also

11. Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water
Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENvTL. L & POL'Y 55, 56- 57 (2008)
(discussing and answering the critique that adaptation deflects attention away from
mitigation); Orr Karassin, Mind the Gap: Knowledge and Need in RegulatingAdaptation to
Climate Change, 22 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 383, 388 (2010) (offering a regulatory
framework to guide adaptation and providing useful comparative examples of
ongoing efforts).
12. Press Release, NASA, NASA Study Links Earth Impacts to Human-Caused
Climate Change (May 14, 2008).
13.

E.g.,

STEPHEN SAUNDERS

ET AL.,

HOTrER AND DRIER: THE WEST'S CHANGED

CLIMATE 6-7, 17 (2008); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 5, at 113; ADLER, supra
note 3, at 10-17. In 2009, Colorado's peak snow melt occurred several weeks earlier
than normal, which may be pose a problem for direct flow irrigators in western

Colorado. Colleen O'Connor, Colorado's Snowmelt's Early Flow May Be Issue, DENVER
POST, June 17, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12604156.
14. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-WaterNexus and the U.S.
Electric Utility Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 11, 36, 50 (2009).
15. In 2008, the National Research Council convened a workshop on the future of
water use in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa
River Basins, and participants were divided on the issue of whether all uses could be
supplied in the future, although "[a]ttendees generally acknowledged that additional
population growth would add further stresses to the water supply system." SUMMARY
OF A WORKSHOP ON WATER ISSUES IN THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT AND

ALABAMA-COOSA-TALLAPOOSA

(ACF-ACT)

RIVER

BASINS
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http://www.naedonline.org/images/NRCACF-ACTApril09.pdf.
AMERICA,

ExPOSED: SOCIAL VULNERABILITY

AND

CLIMATE

(2009),

available at

See also OXFAM
CHANGE

IN

SOUTHEAST 6-8 (2009), available at http://adapt.oxfamamerica.org/resources/
ExposedReport.pdf.

THE

US
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experience lower summer water flows in major, heavily used rivers.'"
The Great Lakes is an example of a region that may face new stresses.
A synthesis of the climate change literature for the Great Lakes
concludes that:
Mean annual lake surface evaporation could increase by as much as
39% due to an increase in lake surface temperatures. This will
present particular concern during summer and autumn, which are
already characterized by low stream flow. Moreover, with increased

evapotranspiration and decreased snowpack, less moisture will enter
the soil and groundwater zones, and runoff will be even further
decreased.
Consequently, under future warmer and drier
conditions, Great Lakes residents could7 become more vulnerable to
water supply and demand mismatches.'
Most water managers have already absorbed the first lesson of
GCC water scenarios. Water managers have taken the possibility of
altered flows and more intense flood events very seriously, and GCC
is now a relevant factor that all major state and federal planning
studies consider.'" The question remains: Do we know enough to
mandate new management strategies or change existing legal
regimes? There is still great uncertainty. The problem starts with
distinguishing GCC-induced change from the "normal" climate
variability that was observed before anthropogenic greenhouse gas
contributions reached their present dangerous levels. For example,
between 2005 and 2007 the Southeast United States experienced a
severe drought that stressed Atlanta's water supply and destroyed
billions of dollars worth of crops in Alabama and Georgia."
However, Columbia University scientists have concluded that the
stresses were the product of regional population growth and bad
planning, not GCC.2 ' To take more concrete steps, more must be
known about the geographic scale, the timing, and the magnitude of
the projected impacts of GCC.21 Likewise, 2009 was marked by wild
16. See Noah D. Hall & Bret B. Stuntz, Climate Change and Great Lakes Water
Resources: Avoiding Future Conflicts with Conservation, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 639, 645-48
(2008).
17.

Id. at 645.
See BARRY NELSON ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, IN HOT WATER: WATER
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO WEATHER THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING 1-4 (2007);
MICHAEL KIPARSKY & PETER H. GLEICK, PAC. INST. FOR STUDIES IN DEV., ENv'T, & SEC.,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES: A SURVEY AND SUMMARY OF THE
LITERATURE 4 (2003).

18.

19. 'Killer' Southeast Drought Low on Scale, Says Study, EARTH INSTITUTE, Oct. 01,
2009, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2541;
Forrest Laws, Drought
Devastates Alabama's Tennessee Valley, S.E. FARM PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007,
http://southeastfarmpress.com/drought-devastates-alabamas-tennessee-valley.
20. Richard Seager et al., Drought in the Southeastern United States: Causes,
Variability over the Last Millennium, and the Potential for Future Hydroclimate
Change, 22J. CLIMATE 5021, 5022-23 (2009).
21. See Jaime Anderson et al., Progress on Incorporating Climate into
Management of California's Water Resources, 87 CLIMATIC CHANGE S91, S106-08
(2008).
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temperature swings: from record warmth in September for California
and Nevada, to record lows in July for the eastern Great Plains and
the Ohio Valley.22 But, in the latest assessment of the world's 2009
climate, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrative
Climate Attribution team concluded that, "[s]uch seasonal extremes
most certainly were not the result of human-induced climate
.
change."2
C. How CAN WATER MANAGERS, LEGISLATURES ANDJUDGES ADAPT?
Adaptation can take many forms, but water managers have settled
on six primary strategies: (1) the greater use of integrated regional
water management, including adaptive management,24 to balance
ground and surface water use and to incorporate environmental
considerations into existing flow regimes; (2) the use of markets to
reallocate water among competing uses, primarily transfers from
irrigated agriculture to urban and environmental uses; (3) the
promotion of more aggressive agricultural and urban water
conservation; (4) the promotion of more water and energy efficient
urban settlement patterns in water stressed areas by linking water,
energy consumption, and land use planning and regulation;25 (5)
technological fixes such as desalination;26 and (6) the capture of more
runoff.2 7
This list does not include changes in water law, but there are at
least five possible water law adaptation scenarios. First, the existing
law could adapt with no changes. 8 Second, the law could evolve over
time, as it always has, as new conditions require the reevaluation of
the utility of various doctrines, especially those that encourage
inefficient use patterns. 9 Third, state legislatures could intervene to
22. M.P. Hoerling, Strong Seasonality in 2009 U.S. Temperatures, in 91 STATE OF
THE CLIMATE IN 2009 (Special Supplement) S140, S140 (D.S. Arndt et al. eds., 2010).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See Daniel Schramm & Akiva Fishman, Legal Frameworks for Adaptive Natural
Resource Management in .a Changing Climate, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 491, 492, 504
(2010).
25. See Ileana Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 588 (2009).
26. See Robin Kundis Craig, Water Supply, Desalination, Climate Change, and Energy
Policy, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 225, 235-36 (2010).
27. California has a similar list. See STATE OF CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., MANAGING
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA'S

WATER 12 (2008), availableat http://www.water.ca.gov/publications/
browse.cfm?letter= M.
28. Sometimes, the common law can adapt to new. technologies or other changed
conditions by not changing. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
In Intel, the California Supreme Court refused to apply the common law tort of
trespass to real property, which presumes damage from any entry on land in the
possession of another, to mass emails by a former, disgruntled Intel employee sent
through the company's system. Id. at 309. The court instead applied trespass to
chattels, which requires a showing of actual damage to personal property, in part to
preserve an open Internet. Id. at 302, 311.
29. At the beginning of the environmental movement, there was concern that
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make more drastic changes in the law.
Fourth, the federal
government could exercise its constitutional power to preempt state
law that Congress deems a barrier to adaptation. Fifth, other
developments, such as laws designed to promote more sustainable
urban growth, could, for example, exert indirect pressure on water
law to harden its risk allocation function. As the rest of the article
indicates, one can find examples of all these scenarios with the
possible exception of federal preemption.
II. WATER LAW AS A PERFECT ADAPTIVE, RISK ALLOCATION
SYSTEM?
The least costly adaptation strategy is to use the existing law of
water rights to adapt. The case for this strategy is that due to the
"natural" vagaries of climate risk,. allocation is the central feature of
all water rights. In theory, water law has always functioned as a
shortage allocation system which assigns the risks of drought among
users thus forcing those most at risk to adapt. Thus, water rights are
of necessity correlative, because water is not always available in the
desired quantities due to climate variation and is uniquely necessary
for human and ecosystem survival. Thus, water rights have always
been incomplete rather than complete property rights."o Water is
simultaneously semi-exclusive, a shared and partially communal
resource. 3 ' Of necessity, each user's right is subject to the rights of
other similarly situated users on a stream or over an aquifer. No user
has the power to exclude completely other users to the extent that a
landowner can punish trespassers." The state has great discretion to
establish the ground rules for the acquisition and exercise of water
rights and to recognize private rights, as well as to subordinate them
to public rights and public interest limitations.
The net conclusion is that water law has always provided users

courts would not recognize instream flow appropriations because there was no
physical diversion. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All
the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 401-02 (Mont. 2002). However, courts have generally held
that as long as the water is put to beneficial use, which includes minimum flow
maintenance, and other users have notice of the right, there is no need for an
"actual" or physical diversion. Id. at 406.
30. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 493 (Haw. 2000).
31. SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption and Water Law Reforn, 15
WIDENER L. REv. 409, 418 (2010).
- 32. Compare Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160, 164 (Wis.
1997) (court awarded one dollar in actual and 100,000 dollars in punitive damages
for nominal trespass because "landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who
trespass ... will be appropriately punished."), with Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Park
Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 696 (Colo. 2002) (aquifer recharge
pursuant to plan of augmentation that passes beneath various overlying tracts before
withdrawal is not a trespass).
33. See, e.g., Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d at 709-10. But see Scott Andrew
Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation
& EcologicalProtection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 1063, 1068
(2009).
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clear notice of the risks of a reduction in the amount of water to
which they will be entitled. The risks include reduced quantities
because of a drought, the wasteful or non-beneficial use of water, and
total or partial displacement by a "higher" or subsequent use,
including public rights.34 Thus, GCC can be characterized as simply
another drought risk to which all users have always been subject.
Users are therefore expected to adopt the most cost-effective
adaptation strategy and will not be surprised if this requires makingdo with less water than was previously available." The rub is that
water law has not been widely used for this function." Until recently,
nature and human intervention kept the risks of supply curtailment
low and the expectation of full enjoyment of the right high. As a
result, there are major psychological, political, institutional, and legal
barriers to using the law to distribute the extreme risks of global
climate change among large classes of water users in the common law
of riparian rights, prior appropriation and regulated riparianism.
A. RIPARIAN RIGHTS

The common law of riparian rights, which prevails in the East and
to a lesser extent in California and Nebraska, is a system that in
theory, but not in practice, -could be used to adapt to GCC.
Ironically, the common law's much criticized incoherence and lack of
useful precedent pushes users toward adaptation because it creates a
high level of risk to all right holders.
This uncertainty also could
allow courts the flexibility to adjust quantities and uses among
existing users in cases of GCC-induced shortages with minimal fear
34. In rare cases, the public trust may require the displacement of existing water
rights, which impair trust values. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cnty.,
658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983); Accord In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
509 (Haw. 2000). In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2596, 2599 (2010), the Supreme Court held, eight to zero, that a Florida
statute that replaced the common law rule that littoral owners are entitled to coastal
accretions with a statute that fixed erosion control lines and awarded any gain (or
loss) seaward of the line to the state was not a taking. However, the four justice
plurality opinion also suggested, but did not hold, that a judicial decision, such as the
Florida Supreme Court opinion upholding the statutes, could be a judicial taking.
Four justices disagreed with the principle or reasoned that the case was not an
appropriate one to formulate a judicial takings doctrine. Justice Stevens, a Florida
beachfront condominium owner, did not participate in the decision.
Dwight
Merriam, Beach Decision Draws New Line in Sand, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE, June 28, 2010,
http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.aspx?ID=37566.
35. All "real" water allocation conflicts center on the fact that there is an
insufficient amount of water to provide reliable supplies for all competing users, thus
some alteration of the status quo is inevitable. See Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, The Nile
Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a 'Water Security'
Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?, 21 Eur. J. Int'l L. 421, 432-34
(2010). GCC simply drives home this point.
36. See also Adler, supra note 3, at 24.
37. SeeJoseph W. Dellapena, AdaptingRiparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106
W. Va. L. Rev. 539, 559-61 (2004). But see Dellapenna, supra note 31, at 430
(explaining that the conventional thinking is that the common law of riparian rights
does not promote adaptation).
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that the parties could successfully challenge these adjustments as a
taking of property without due process of law."
From an environmental but not reallocation perspective, the early
common law was adaptive, if inefficient, by neo-welfare economic
standards. Riparian rights were originally limited solely to owners of
riparian land, a term that remains incompletely defined in most
Reallocation was difficult because of the narrow class of
states."
water right holders and per se rules that prohibited the use of water
on non-riparian land or on land outside the watershed; riparian users
could enjoin non-watershed and non-riparian uses without a showing
of injury,40 although courts seldom applied these rules.4 1 However,
this rigid law promoted flow maintenance, which will be an important
element in the conservation of aquatic ecosystems impacted by
GCC.42 The perceived inefficiencies in the common law led to major
changes. Over time the common law was modified to allow water to
Courts and legislatures
be used where the demand is highest."
moved from using property rules to using tort rules in the name of
efficiency and focused on the injuries, if any, that non-watershed and
non-riparian uses cause.44 The shift to tort rules has opened rivers to
38. For example, almost all courts have rejected constitutional challenges to
switches from the common law of riparian rights to prior appropriation so long as
the law protected actual use of water. See, e.g., Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708,
711-13 (S.D. 1964). Only Oklahoma has upheld a constitutional challenge to the
elimination of unused riparian rights. See Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water
Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 576-77 (Okla. 1990). See also Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257, 267-69 (1990)
(discussing how water laws have been continuously revised over time for public
benefit). But see Shepard, supra note 33, at 1134 (arguing that water rights should be
treated as any other private good and subject to the terms of the Constitution's
"Takings Clause").
39. All jurisdictions agree that the land must reach the high water mark of astream during some part of the year, under ordinary flow conditions. See, e.g., Turner
v. James Canal Co., 99 P. 520, 523-26 (Cal. 1909); In re Determination of the Ordinary
High Water Mark & Outlet Elevation for Beaver Lake, 466 N.W.2d 163, 166-67 (S.D.
1991). Under this standard, GCC might strip some land of its riparian status.
Heretofore, the major issue has been the extent of riparian land. The source-of-thetitle rule limits riparian land to the smallest tract of abutting land in a chain of title
from a single track that was once riparian. Thus, riparian land can shrink over time.
The unity-of-title. allows reasonable additions of land to an original riparian tract.
Some defend the latter as more suitable for the east. See William H. Farnham, The
PermissibleExtent of RiparianLand, 7 Land & Water L. Rev. 31, 58-61 (1972). However,
the source-of-title rule, which was adopted in California to limit riparian rights, could
be defended as better adapted to GCC adaptation because it promotes prior
appropriation, which is a better climate adaptation law. See infra pp. 18-20.
40. See Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 981 (Cal. 1907).
41. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 103 N.E. 87, 89 (Mass. 1913)
(stating that the diversion alone without evidence of damage did not warrant a
recovery of even nominal damages).
42. See Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparianjurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95, 107-08,
111-12 (1985).
43. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:89 (Marie-Joy
Paredes & Susan Mauceri, eds., 2010).
44. See e.g., Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 536 (Cal. 1966) (stating that reasonable
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a wider class of users to promote the more efficient use of water but
at the cost of increasing the uncertainty of rights. Originally, riparian
rights were non-consumptive rights used to support mill power.45
Each riparian had an equal right to the stream's natural flow,
undiminished in quantity and quality." Thus, the scope of the right
was relatively easy to calculate. But, because the natural flow theory
prevented all but run-of-the-river dams and most consumptive
diversions, 17 the law promoted flow maintenance. Flow maintenance
will be important element in the conservation of aquatic ecosystems
impacted by GCC," but this limitation was deemed unsuited for an
emerging industrial, urban economy. Today, the natural flow theory
has been replaced by the reasonable use theory that permits
diversions and storage," but the right to make these uses remains
inchoate and uncertain.
The main source of uncertainty is the lack of protection for prior
uses. All riparian landowners have an equal right to use the water."o
Thus, in theory, courts can displace prior users to make room for
subsequent or higher valued uses." This does not allow existing nor
prospective users to have a high expectation that the amount of water
they withdraw will remain constant over time. Uncertainty can either
chill adaptation measures, such as water transfers, or encourage
adaptation to reduce the uncertainty. In general, the firmer the right,
the more adaptation is facilitated. Two major steps have been taken
to create firm riparian rights. First, in 1979, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts retained the common law's inchoate, open-ended
balancing test, which allows courts to consider a wide range of factors
to determine the reasonableness of a riparian proprietor's water use,
but tweaked the factors it in the name of certainty.5 2 Second, state
agencies have issued regulated riparian permits that introduce a
greater security of right into the common law.
850 of the Restatement of Torts sets out the factors to be

use under riparian doctrine is a rule of tort rather than a rule of property). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41 (2010) (discussing interference with the use
of water).
45. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 3 (1997).
46. Id.
47. See Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 612 (Cal. 1926) (holding
that the natural flow theory prevented upstream dams that altered the flow used by
downstream riparians). But see CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (amended 1974) (enshrining
reasonable use into the state constitution).
48. See Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparianjurisdiction:
Defining the RelationshipBetween Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 95, 115-16
(1985) (discussing the ecological impact of diversion).
49. See, e.g., Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 15 N.W. 167, 168-69 (Minn. 1883).
50. E.g., White v. Whitney MFG. Co., 38 S.E. 456, 460 (S.C. 1901).
51. See Crum v. Craig, No. CA09-1203, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 546, at *13-14 (Ark.
Ct. App. June 23, 2010) (citing Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955)).
52.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

53.

See infra pp. 16-17 and note 5858.
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considered in determining a reasonable use of water. The section
provides a nine-factor test, and the relevant factors include: (1) the
purpose of the use; (2) the suitability of the use to the water body; (3)
the economic value of the use; (4) the social value of the use; (5) the
extent and amount of harm it causes; (6) the practicality of avoiding
harm by adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor or the
other; and (7) the protection of existing values of water uses. 54 The
first six factors basically restate the balancing test developed by courts
in the mid-nineteenth century.. The seventh is new. The protection
of prior uses is not, however, an express common law factor, but it
was added to the test on the ground that it represents judicial practice
because prior uses are seldom actually displaced and it promotes the
more efficient use of water.
For all its faults, reasonable.use balancing is a potentially adaptive
doctrine. The Restatement was drafted in the 1960s and 1970s before
climate change appeared on the environmental agenda, but GCC
could be legitimately factored into the balancing test.5 6 Courts could
use the reasonable use theory to order pro rata cutbacks if GCC
creates permanently lowered stream flows. Section 850 could allow
courts to pick winners and losers among GCC-stressed uses, beyond
those protected by the preference of domestic use, and to develop a
wide rata of cut back formulae. Still, it will be hard to use Section 850
balancing for this purpose because it was primarily designed to
reduce the common law's uncertainty by protecting prior uses. Thus,
flexibility has been curtailed in the name of creating firmer rights.
Any GCC adaptation is therefore likely to occur through water
transfers.
Regulated
The second reform is regulated riparianism.
riparianism partially displaces the common law of riparian rights by
overlaying a permit system on it.57 As occurs in Western states, a
state agency issues water use permits that seek to introduce greater
security of right into the common law." Regulated riparian permits
are potentially more adaptive compared to prior. appropriation
permits because legislation often gives state water administers some
flexibility to condition new uses, use public interest considerations in

54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (2010).
55. SeeJ.H Beusher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10
BUFF. L. REV. 448, 451-52 (1961). See also Edmondson v. Edwards, 111 S.W.3d 906,
909-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (a modern application of priority in a riparian
jurisdiction).
56. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global
Climate Change and Other HydropoliticalStresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES AsS'N 1301,
1308-10 (1999).
.57. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 9.03, 9-52 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelly eds., 2007 repl. vol.).
58. Permit systems are seldom comprehensive. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-243
to 246 (2010) (requiring permits for new withdrawals only in declared surface
management areas, which can only be declared after withdrawals are likely to impair
natural flows and associated instream values).
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deciding among competing applicants, and refuse, in whole or part,
to renew time-limited permits. ' However, once a permit is issued,
the state is unlikely to revoke it or issue inconsistent subsequent
permits.o This hampers efforts to use the flexibility of regulated
In addition, permit systems do not
riparianism to adapt to GCC.'
On the plus side, permit rights
always cover all withdrawals or use.
can encourage transfers that promote market adaptation.
GCC will also impact aquifer recharge, but groundwater law is
even less adaptive than the common law of surface use. In contrast to
the common law of riparian rights, sharing rules were initially applied
only to surface water. Groundwater was allocated by a pure capture
rule, which provides almost no incentives to adapt because there is
little risk of curtailment of the privilege to pump.6
In most states,
the reasonable use rule has replaced pure capture, 6 although the
right to pump without restriction still applies in a few states, most
notably Texas. 6 ' Reasonable use does not substantially limit the right
to capture; the owners overlying an aquifer can capture without
restraint, but non-overlying owners cannot pump water if overlying
owners are injured. In practice, it functions primarily to force cities
to pay farmers and small users for damages caused by high capacity
municipal well fields that are drilled to export water to non-overlying
areas.' The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 858 goes further
and provides a remedy for small overlying pumpers injured by large
overlying pumpers," but the expectations of continued pumping are
high in almost all states.
B. PRIOR APPROPRIATION: A PERFECT ADAPTATION INSTITUTION- IN
THEORY

Prior appropriation is a better adaptation candidate because it is a

59. E.g., FIA. STAT. § 373.233 (2010)
60. E.g., Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(limiting the water allowance for a new applicant in order to protect prior municipal
well field).
61. See Dellapenna, supra note 57, at §9.03(a)(5), 9-74 (describing intricate
procedures necessary for obtaining a new permit).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-243 (2010) (listing exceptions to Virginia's surface water
withdrawal permits).
63. See Dellapenna, supra note 57, at § 9.03(d), 9-132.
64. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, Watercourses-Channel,Bed and Bank, and Flow,
2010 L.WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES § 3:22.
65. Sipriano v. Great Springs Waters of Am., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999); see also
Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 357 (Wis. 1903).
66. E.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 709
N.W.2d 174, 197 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich.
2007).
67. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 75.
68. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Michaels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 349-50
(Wis. 1974); Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 74 A. 379, 384-85 (N.J. 1909).
69. See, e.g., Michaels Pipeline Constr., 217 N.W.2d at 350.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).

Issue 1

STRESSES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

13

Water law performs three basic
firm risk allocation scheme.
functions: (1) it sets the ground rules for the acquisition of secure
rights to use water; (2) it allocates scare water resources between
competing private and public uses and requires the internalization of
some of the social costs of use because water performs a variety of
essential societal functions; and (3) it distributes the pain of shortages
among right holders. By these standards, prior appropriation could
function as a complete GCC adaptation regime."
Prior appropriation is already a risk allocation scheme, because it
clearly assigns all risks of climate variability to junior users and
eliminates the inchoate and inefficient features of the common law of
According to the catechism, the law of prior
riparian rights.
appropriation allocates water in times of shortage by the strict
enforcement of priority schedules, which provide fair notice to junior
users of their potential risks. There is no pro rata sharing, as there is
under the common law of riparian rights. The risk of shortage
curtailment is assigned completely to the most recent right holders,
This
who can be required to bear the full costs of senior calls..
to
compared
system
allocation
risk
is
a
superior
seemingly harsh rule
riparianism;
or
regulated
rights
of
riparian
either the common law
junior appropriators have strong incentives to use the market to
reallocate water or to take other adaptive measures such as
investment in more efficient water use technologies or temporary
fallowing.Theoretically, two aspects of prior appropriation strengthen
the incentives to adapt. First, the severance of water rights from land,
which allows appropriators to use water anywhere they can within a
state,73 will strengthen adaptation incentives. The second aspect that
will strengthen adaptation incentives is the beneficial use doctrine,
that requires a water right be put to continuous, non-wasteful
(beneficial) use,74 or it will be lost through forfeiture or
abandonment.
C. THEORY MEETS REALITY (AND MONEY) IN THE EAST AND WEST

There is a large disconnect between the theory and reality for at
least three related reasons. First, water law, like all property, is
designed to provide secure rights, but security creates the expectation
Thus, there will
of the perpetual maintenance of the status quo.

71. Adler, supra note 3, at 25-26.
72. See, e.g., Neb. ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 244-45 (Neb. 1940).
73. Ironically, many states have imposed statutes that prohibit or restrict the
export of water across state lines. E.g., Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
While export prohibitions are a presumptive unconstitutional
956-58 (1981).
discrimination against interstate commerce, statutes that prefer in-state users to outof-state users for demonstrated conservation reasons may be constitutional. Id. at
958.
74. State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044,1049 (Wash. 1993).
75. E.g., Jenkins v. State Dep't of Water Res., 647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Idaho 1982).
76. See Sarah Harding, PerpetualProperty, 61 FLA. L. REV. 286 (2009).
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always be resistance to forward adaptive planning. Change is not only
surprising, but any change that reduces that amount of water
Second, the
previously available is potentially unconstitutional."
Federal government and states such as California, have nourished the
"illusion" of perpetual security by investing millions of dollars in tax
revenues and bond sales to construct the necessary carry-over storage
to avoid disruptive calls. 7 ' Third, junior users often have put water to
high valued uses compared to senior right holders. These junior
users have every incentive to push back politically and legally when
disruptive calls are threatened. In short, the continued protection of
existing rights is potentially inconsistent with the proposed adaptation
strategies which encourage increased flexibility in response to change,
greater recognition - of the risks of supply interruption, more
cooperation among all users (whether it be from small watersheds or
large regions), and real time water use management.
The net result of this disconnect between theory and reality, is
that users do not expect that "real," pain-causing allocations will
actually happen. The law of riparian rights is a "use and be sued" rule
with low risks of a challenge by other similarly situated users. In the
Eastern states, nature has provided sufficient ground and surface
water to meet all competing demands; right holders seldom face
serious risks of curtailment, except on very small steams. The
expectation of supply disruption should be more widely accepted in
the prior appropriation states, but ironically, the expectation of no
supply disruption is as strong in the arid and semi-arid West as it is in
the East. Priority administration does occur on small streams, but the
Western states have worked hard to make sure that there are few
The thrust of federal and state water policy from the
calls.8"
conservation era until the 1970s was to minimize the risks of
The
shortages by constructing large carry-over storage facilities."
West is now living off that legacy, although the amount of constructed
carry-over storage may not provide the cushion that it has in the past.
In addition to the dams and reservoirs which vein the West, formal
and informal mechanisms also exist to share the burdens of shortages

77. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
78. California's efforts to redress the historic imbalance between the northern
California, where most of the water originates, and southern California, where most
of the state's population lives, is well told in NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST:
CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY (Rev. Ed. 2001).
79. Stephen Draper, The Impact of Climate Change on Interstate/InternationalWater
Sharing, 11 WATER RESOURCES COMMITEE NEWSL. (A.B.A., Chi., Ill.), Feb. 2009, at 5,
11, availableat http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/waterresources/
newsletter/archives.html (noting that interstate and international agreements that
require fixed water delivery schedules "no longer appears to be viable for the future,"
and future agreements may include adjustable flow percentage entitlements with a
"real time feed back loop that provides river stages . . . at various locations on the
river on a regular basis." Id. at 11.
80. See Adler, supra note 3, at 24.
81. Id.
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by pro rata rather than pro tanto delivery reductions.
D.JUNIOR PUSH BACK: A CASE STUDY IN RESISTANCE TO RISK
ALLOCATION
The expectation that there will be limited enforcement of
priorities means that existing users will resist the consequences of any
curtailment of withdrawals in both riparian and appropriative states.
Two examples are offered below. The first, from a regulated
riparianism jurisdiction, illustrates how the introduction of a permit
system can promote adaptation but may also impede it. The second,
from a prior appropriation state, illustrates the lengths to which a
state may go to avoid calls on junior appropriators and thus preserve
the status quo, a result that may not produce the necessary GCC
adaptation.
1. Regulated Riparianism
Regulated riparianism gives the state some flexibility to adjust to
new conditions. Permits are not perpetual as they are in the West,
but water use permits introduce a high degree of stability into any
system. Thus, it will be hard to dislodge them even though the law
permits the reassignment of rights as Georgia's response to a severe
drought illustrates." A severe, prolonged drought started in the Flint
River Basin in 1998 and did not break until 2009.84 The river is at the
center of an on-going interstate dispute among Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia concerning two river basins." The nub of this dispute is that
downstream Alabama and Florida challenge upstream Georgia's
claims to the. amount of stored water in a Corps of Engineers'
reservoir necessary to keep Atlanta watered.8 6 While the states were
trying to negotiate an interstate compact, Georgia took the proactive
step of dealing with the risks of intrastate and interstate shortages in a
Georgia passed the Flint
major downstream agricultural basin.
permits for ground
requires
which
Act
Protection
Drought
River
In addition, when
day.
per
gallons
100,000
diversions-over
surface
Protection
Environmental
of
the
Director
the
declared,
is
a drought
82. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Out-of-Priority Water Use: Adding Flexibility to the
Water Apppriation System, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 485, 494-504 (2004).
83. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver System (ACF) Timeline of Action as ofJuly 27,
2009, FLA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT. (Jul. 27, 2009), http://www.dep.state.fl.us/
mainpage/acf/timeline.htm.
84. Drought Status Eases to Mild; More Rain Expected Today, GAINESVILLE TIMES
(Georgia), May 5, 2009, http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/archives/18449/.
85. FLA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., supra note 83.
86. The literature on the controversy and the states' inability to resolve their
competing claims through an interstate compact is vast. Robert Haskell Abrams,
Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 31 HAMLINE L.
REv. 679 (2008), is a good introduction.
87. Id. at 691.
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-540 et seq. (2010) (Flint River Drought Protection Act);
GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a)(1)(A) (2010) (surface water).
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Divisi6n of the Department of Natural Resources may set the number
of acres that must be retired for the irrigation season." This allowed
Georgia to meet the minimum Flint River flows informally promised
to Florida." The costs of fallowing are borne by the public, and
farmers bid the price per acre that they will accept to participate in
the program." However, if the auction does not produce the target
reduction, the Director can begin to revoke the most recent permits
and "work chronologically backward with each order issued."9 2
The state initially issued agricultural use permits for groundwater
based on the amounts used prior to 1988, but it realized that it had to
tighten the permits based on the 1998 data.93 Earlier data was not a
reliable indicator to determine how much water the auctions actually
saved, because the state did not know the amount of actual - let alone
beneficial - prior use. After 2003, Georgia limits new permits to
twenty-five-year terms and may renew existing permits at a lower
capacity if they "would have unreasonable adverse effects upon other
water uses."94 The reality is that the permit system entrenches large
withdrawals. The 2001 auction withdrew about 33,000 acres from
production.95 The state calculated that the withdrawals increased the
flow of the Flint by about 399 acre feet per day, but this figure has
been questioned." GCC could be factored into the Georgia permit
system because permits over twenty-five years require a supply
adequacy determination that must be periodically reviewed.97 But,
because the permits allow a user to withdraw as much water as they
can use to grow any commodity, the permits will be hard to cancel;

89. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-547 (2010).
90. Pamela P. Holliday, Fighting Over the Flint: Balancing Human Demands with
Ecosystem Needs, SHERPA GUIDES, http://www.sherpaguides.com/georgia/flint-river/
waterresources/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).
91. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-541 (2010); id. § 12-5-546.
92. Id. § 12-5-547.
93. Id. § 12-5-105. See generally ROBIN JOHN MCDOWELL, GA. ENvTL. PROT. DIv.,
STATUS OF THE FLINT RIVER REGIONAL WATER DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION PLAN,

1-2 (2003), availableat http://www.uga.edu/water/GWRC/Papers/
McDowellRob%20GWRC%20Paper%20revised.pdf.
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a)(3) (2010). See generally John L. Fortuna, Water
Rights, Public Resources, and Private Commodities: Examining the Current and Future Law
Governing the Allocation of Georgia Water, 38 GA. L. REV. 1009 (2004); Wilson G.
Barmeyer, The Problem of Reallocation in A Regulated Riparian System: Examining the Law
in Georgia, 40 GA. L. REV. 207 (2005).
95. Swagata "Ban" Banerjee et al., ForecastingIrrigation Water Demand: A Case Study
on the Flint River Basin in Georgia, 39 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED EcON. 641, 642 (2007),
availableat http://purl.umn.edu/37053.
96. Id.
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a), (g), (h) (2010); but see RONALD CUMMINGS ET AL.,
AGRICULTURAL WATER USE DURING DROUGHT: AN ANALYSIS OF
MANAGING
CONTEMPORARY POLICIES GOVERNING GEORGIA'S FLINT RIVER BASIN 32 (2007), available

at http-//www.h2opolicycenter.org/pdf documents/water-workingpapers/WP2007001_final.pdf (analyzing the EPD permit system and concluding that the rights of
permittees are highly uncertain due to the Director's considerable discretion in
modification or renewal).
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this impedes, if not frustrates, adaptation.9 8 Furthermore, financial
hardship or circumstances beyond the control of the user are
cancellation defenses, and the Director of the Department of Natural
Resources "shall give preference to existing use over an initial
application,"9 9 which also impedes adaptation incentives.
2. Prior Appropriation
Junior appropriators will not always accept the necessity for a call
by senior appropriators. In many cases, junior appropriators have
strong financial incentives to seek legal redress against a call or to
negotiate a new sharing regime with seniors. The efforts of junior
appropriators in Idaho's Snake River Plain to resist priority calls
illustrate the power of high valued junior users to modify the law of
prior appropriation, to their advantage.oo Starting in 1993, senior
appropriators began making calls on junior pumpers, but the state
has, nimbly, tried to avoid shutting off junior users, who are mainly
large groundwater pumpers.1o' The issue came to a head in 2005
when two trout farms in the Magic Valley made a call, and rejected an
initial offer from junior pumpers to 45,000 acre feet of replacement
water. 02 The Department of Water Resources eventually threatened
to shut down pumps for 33,000 acres and several towns and industries
in the Valley-the nation's major source of potatoes for fast food
chains. i03 Not surprisingly, the state tried to avoid this drastic and
economically disruptive step by adopting new call rules, titled the
Conjunctive Management of Surface and Ground Water Resources.104
In brief, these rules allow the Director of the Idaho Department of
Water Resources to apply a combination of two traditional doctrines
to avoid calls. The first is the futile call doctrine, which is seldom
applied, but allows a court or water master to reject a call by a senior
if the junior's curtailed use would not actually produce additional
"wet water" at the senior's point of diversion. 105 The second doctrine

98. Banerjee, supra note 95.
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(f) (2010).
100. Memorandum from the Surface Water Commission to Karl J. Dreher, Dir.
Idaho Dep't of Water Res. (Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
101. Richard A. Slaughter & John D. Wiener, Water, Adaptation, and Property Rights
on the Snake and Klamath Rivers, 43 J. AM. WATER RES. Ass'N 308, 316 (2007).
102. Idaho Poised to Shut Down Hundreds of Groundwater Uses, U.S. WATER NEWS
ONLINE, June 2007, http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcrights/
7idahpois6.html.
Curtailment, TIME-NEWS
of
Consequences
The
103. Matt . Christensen,
MAGICVALLEY.COM (Idaho), MAY 5, 2007,
http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/article-b273be4e-61b9-582 7 -9d9568825b0028cf.html.
104. IDAHO ADMIN CODE 1. 37.03.11.001 (2010).
105. IDAHO ADMIN CODE 10. 37.03.11.010; see also In the leading case, State ex reL
Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940), Nebraska ordered junior appropriators
on the North Platte River to forego diversions because 700 cubic feet per second
were required to deliver 162 cubic feet to senior appropriators at Kearney on the
Platte because of carriage loses. Cary, 292 N.W. at 245. The Court rejected the
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posits that a senior's means of diversion must be reasonable before a
call will be honored.o' Ironically, an early Supreme Court case
involving the Snake River Plain announced the doctrine. 0 7 In an
early irrigation era case, the Supreme Court held that the state could
refuse a call by a senior, who claimed a large base flow of the Snake
River to turn a water wheel to bring the amount of his right to the top
of a gorge, against a junior irrigation district that constructed a dam
across the river.'"
The Court questioned whether all the water
the
wheel was in fact an appropriation, and
needed to operate
squarely held that "[s]uch use also lacks one of the essential attributes
of an appropriation; -it is not reasonable." 0 9
Regarding these new call rules, the seniors initially succeeded in
convincing a district court that the rules violated their constitutional
right to divert, because they did not permit the timely administration
of water rights and failed to include a presumption that any junior
withdrawal in times of shortage is a per se interference with senior
But the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
surface rights."
reasoned that the Director of the Department of Water Resources
needed the discretion to decide when to honor a call."' Thus, no
presumption of interference was necessary because the rules
contained sufficient standards and did not constitute a re-adjudication
of decreed water rights." 2 The court also held that a contrary ruling
would ignore "the constitutional requirement that priority over water
be extended only to those using the water."" 3 In the end, rather than
mandating the speedy delivery of water based on a strict enforcement
of priorities, the court instead decided that it was more important to
have the administrative agency charged with allocating this public
resource make scientifically-informed decisions about the extent of
injury to a senior users." 4 In the course of the opinion, the Court
observed that "[w]hile the Constitution; statutes and case law in Idaho
set forth the principles of the prior appropriation doctrine, those
principles are more easily stated than applied. These principles
become especially more difficult, and harsh, in their application in
times of drought.""' This candid but seldom voiced observation
from a "hard core" prior appropriation court could be the basis for

arguments that the call was futile or that calls were subject to a reasonableness
standard because allowing so much discretion in a water master would "destroy the
very purpose of the doctrine of appropriation existent in this state." Id. at 247.
106. IDAHOADMIN CODE 20. 37.03.11.020.
107. Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
108. Id. at 115-16, 124-25.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433,
445, 448 (Idaho 2007).
111. Id. at 446-47
112. Id. at 449.
113. Id. at 447.
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id. at 440.
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the development of a general doctrine where GCC demands that all
diversions be reasonable and that senior appropriators must expect,
within the parameters of the Fifth Amendment, some adjustment to
the sources of their rights.
To resolve the Magic Valley conflict, junior users offered several
mitigation plans to senior users. Also, in 2008, the Idaho Water
Resource Board and the City of Twin Falls purchased Pristine
Springs, which will provide ten cubic feet per second of mitigation
water to the trout farm making calls, thus providing junior users with
greater security in their out-of-priority water use. 6 But, seniors
continue to make calls. The Department of Water Resources avoided
a shutdown in 2009 after it decided to stay its shutdown order and
evaluate a new mitigation plan.117 Still, the conflict between senior
and junior right holders continues. 1 8
Idaho's experiences provide mixed lessons to water managers
when broadly considered in the context of GCC adaptation.The
Magic Valley story shows that when prior appropriation creates a class
of losers and the economic stakes are high, there will be pressure for
administrators to make crude cost-benefit analyses to ease the
strictness of prior appropriation. This could promote adaptation in
several ways. All users will face pressure to invest in the technology to
use water more efficiently; extralegal stakeholder solutions will
emerge to consider alternatives such as land retirement, set-aside
pools, and shifting the cost of adaptation to state and federal tax
payers. This may yield flexible, more efficient water use patterns
necessary to any adaptation strategy, but it will rob prior
appropriation of its ability to be used as a hard risk allocation system.
Ultimately, it may simply result in a shift of water from senior to
junior users, which does nothing to deal with more serious GCCinduced shortages.
III. BEYOND WATER RIGHTS
If state law cannot adapt to GCC, there are at least three
important additional ways to secure the necessary re-allocations. The
first strategy builds on the status of state water rights as property
rights and uses the market to reallocate water. The second strategy
either ushers in a new golden era of dam building or facilitates the
reoperation of existing reservoirs in order to squeeze out more hydro

116. Randy Stapilus, ID: Pristine Springs Buy, RIDENBAUGH PRESS/WATER RIGHTS
BLOG (Apr. 28, 2008, 4:46 PM), http://ridenbaugh.com/waterrights/?p=569.
117. See Jared S. Hopkins, Water Users Dodge Bullet; Agency Won't Order Curtailment
Monday, TIME-NEWS MAGICVALLEY.COM (Idaho), Mar. 13, 2009,

http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/article_38a6462d-61b7-56el-995f2e455c694290.html.
118. See generally Randall C. Budge et al., Ground Water & Surface Water Conjunctive
Management Contentions, Delivery Call Litigation in Idaho: Ground Water Users' Perspective,
64 THE WATER REPORT 1, 1-13 (2009) (describing the continuing "water wars" in
Idaho).
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capacity for agricultural or municipal and industrial uses. The third
strategy is to preempt state water law and use the federal Commerce
power to reallocate water. The first is happening, and the second and
third have been proposed but face a wide variety of political and legal
barriers.
A. MARKET ALLOCATION
The market can facilitate adaptation by two primary methods: (1)
water transfers from lower to higher valued uses, and (2) water
banking.
1. Water Marketing
The most promising GCC adaptation strategy is to use the market
to reallocate water to more GCC-stressed uses. In general, these uses
are primarily urban and environmental, and transfers will provide
these right holders with an increased margin of safety during GCCinduced shortages."' Transfers can be permanent, such as severing a
water right from the land, or short term, such as following some land
for an irrigation season. Economists have long criticized western
water law as inefficient because senior rights are generally dedicated
to low value agricultural uses instead of continually moving them to
higher value, alternative uses; ' GCC only strengthens this traditional
critique of western water law. Appropriative water rights have always
been transferable, but the rules are different compared to other
commodities.
The major barrier to adaptation is the correlative and incomplete
nature of water rights, which increase the transaction costs of
transfers. Because water rights have correlative elements, they must
be exercised with regard to their impact on other uses. The most
concrete manifestation of their correlative and incomplete nature is
Unlike other
the protection of junior - appropriative rights.121
property rights, which can be transferred without regard to the effect
on neighboring property holders, an appropriative water right cannot
be transferred unless there is no injury to junior water right
holders. 122
As a result, the primary source of transfer transaction costs is the
need for experts to determine the range of affected water right
holders, the amount of water actually beneficially used by the
sellers, 1' and the amount of return flow to which junior water right

119. See Jonathan H. Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of
Climate Change, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 729, 740-43 (2008).
120. See, E.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1543-44 (1989).
121. See George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1, 13 (1988).
122. Green v. Chaffee Ditch, Co., 371 P.2d 775, 783 (Colo. 1962).
123. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d
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holders are legally entitled.12' The junior protection rule does not bar
transfers, but it does add to the cost of transfers. However, in
addition to protecting the rights of other users, the third party rule
also functions as a watershed protection rule. Thus, it is a basis to
promote adaptation efforts to maintain minimum stream flows and
conserve stressed aquatic ecosystems.
From this, it can be seen that water marketing occurs in both a
legal and political environment that simultaneously encourages and
constrains transfers. The politics of water have long proceeded from
the premise that water is not just another commodity but instead, a
resource with higher, transcendent values.12 1 In arid regions, control
of water means political power, and power is never surrendered with
low transaction costs. There are three relevant parties in any
transaction: (1) sellers, (2) other water right holders, and (3) thirdparty interests such as community claimants or environmental
interests. The question for GCC adaptation is how responsive to
market demand the system will be in the future?
Three water transfer reforms have been proposed to lower
transaction costs and to counter the potential "chilling effect" of
third-party protection rules: (1) transaction cost reduction through
more streamlined procedures; (2) water conservation incentives such
as the ability to transfer the saved water; and (3) water banking. 126
Water marketing advocates argue that streamlining existing
administrative approval processes and eliminating disincentives to
transfers are necessary. One of the major proposed examples of the
latter reform is a legislative reversal of the presumption that saved
water should return to the stream and be open to appropriation by
other claimants.12 7
Legislation in several states allows users to
conserve water and transfer the saved water.12 8 The same result was
reached judicially in a widely noted Utah decision.'2 9 In that case, a
senior flood irrigator switched to sprinkler irrigation with a twentyfive percent efficiency gain. The Court held that the senior "should
be allowed to make the most efficient use of [water]" subject to two
conditions: (1) the senior is limited to the original entitlement, and
(2) that no irrigation runoff has reached the watercourse or an
189, 201 (Colo. 1999) (noting the importance of recording the historical beneficial
use).
124. See CF & I Steel Corp. v. Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Colo. 1972) (noting that
junior appropriator produced no evidence to counter allegation that it would not be
injured).
125. See Green v. Chaffee Ditch, Co., 371 P.2d at 783-84. But see Shepard, supra
note 34, at 1115-18.
126. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to
Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 14 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
105, 150-52 (2008).
127. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 537.460(2) (2010).
128. E.g., id.; see Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the. West, 43
OKLA. L. REv. 119, 122-23 (1990).
129. Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation, Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Utah
1992).
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associated aquifer.'
Transfer reforms have helped to stimulate water transfers, but the
mere existence of water markets will not necessarily "unblock" large
quantities of water. An early study of water transfers in six states
concluded that - with the exception of lawyer-dominated Colorado the current transaction costs of water transfers are not excessive.' 3 1
The real barriers are political not legal.132 A subsequent study found
that transfers are increasing but most transfers are agriculture-toagriculture or urban-to-urban.133 Further, the study found that the
bulk of the water transferred is through short-term leases rather than
To complicate matters, many water rights
permanent sales.134
transfers remove water from agricultural use and dedicate the right to
urban use. Those who object these transfers argue that "third party"
interests such as rural sustainability and instream flow needs should
also be considered in transfers, even though they are only based on
junior water rights.13 1 Water law provides no direct protection for
third party interests, but these claims are increasingly being asserted
both through litigation and the political process. 1 3 While the legal
bases for third-party challenges to transfers vary from state to state,
the larger the transfer, the greater the need to consider third party
impacts. 138
- Riparian rights also may be transferred, but the risks of a transfer
not yielding the expected amount of water are much higher
compared to appropriative rights because of the inherent uncertainty
of common law. Furthermore, the conveyance of a riparian right may
not be a property right transfer at all. It could be characterized as
nothing more than a grantor-grantee contract not to interfere with
the exercise of the granted right, rather than a *conveyance of a
property right.'3 9 Although courts have held that riparian rights are
property rights and may be severed from riparian land,' the cases
are not, however, satisfactory precedent for GCC-adaptation because

130.
131.

Id. at 1228-29.
See LAWRENCE

J.

MAcDONNELL,

THE WATER

TRANSFER

PROCESS AS

A

MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS 53-56,68 (1990).

132. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., InstitutionalPerspectiveson Water Policy and Markets,
81 CAL. L..REv. 671, 673-75 (1993).
133. Jedidiah Brewer, et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1039 (2007).
134. Id. at 1045-46.
135. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 38, 71-72 (1992).
136. Id. at 71-72. See also A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
31943 (6th ed. 2009) (detailing legislative and common law applications of public
interest).
137. E.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104(a) (2009) (economic loss to a community is a
relevant factor in transfer review).
138. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 135, at 3940.
139. Dellapenna, supranote 57, § 7.04(a)(3)(B).
140. E.g., Conrad/Dommel, LLC v. W. Dev. Co., 815 A.2d 828, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2003).
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they primarily involve the severance of non-consumptive rights such
as access and view."' Transfers of consumptive rights face two major
barriers, in addition to the traditional rule that riparian rights must be
presumptively used within the watershed of a stream. First, the
amount of an individual riparian's right is almost always inchoate.14 2
Second, a conveyance only binds the transferor(s);1" other, nonjoining riparians remain free to assert their rights to make a.
reasonable use against the transferee at any time.14 4 Even the grantor
may make a concurrent, but non-injurious use, despite the
conveyance.145 Thus, any transfer is still subject to cut-backs as other
riparians assert their rights.
In addition to these constraints, transfers to non-riparian land or
land outside of the watershed are still problematic because
environmental review has gradually replaced the common law's per se
rules. Today, it is not clear if a court would apply the riparian-nonriparian distinction or the watershed rule, or whether it would
measure reasonableness according to the needs of the grantor or the
grantee. As early as the 1930s, the Supreme Court refused to
incorporate the watershed limitation into the law of equitable
apportionment to allow transbasin diversions for urban growth.146
Modern riparian law provides some support for inter-basin adaptive
transfers. A leading case holds that severed riparian rights may be
used on non-riparian land if there is no injury to other riparians. "'
Regulated riparianism also promotes adaptation because many states
have eliminated the per se rules against inter-basin transfers and. allow
such transfers subject to administrative review.1 18 But, this review
provides new opportunities to oppose transfers.
2. Water Banking
Water banking is another route to tap underused water rights in
times of shortage. .Banking is currently used almost exclusively in
prior appropriation states, but there is no per se reason why it could
not be extended to riparian states, especially those with a functioning
permit system. Banking is a temporary reallocation and works
because in any given year, a water right holder, generally an
agricultural user, may have excess water or may choose to forego
141. See Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 95, 138-40
(1985).
142. Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DEN. WATER L.
REv. 55, 82 (2004).
143. See Portage Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Akron, 846 N.E.2d 478, 492-93
(Ohio 2006).
144. Id.
145. See Borough of Media v. Edgmont Golf Club, Inc., 288 A.2d 803, 804 (Pa.
1972).
146. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670, 672-73 (1931).
147. Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (Ga. 1980).
148. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-248 (2010).
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irrigation for a season. Water banking, therefore, seeks to counter
the "use it or lose it" or "use as much as can" penalty by allowing
irregular, short-term transfers which do not impair the tenure of the
underlying right. But for that reason, advocates of banking have
feared that abandonment or forfeiture rules, if applied, would chill
any incentives to conserve water through water banking.
Despite this fear, several states now utilize water banking. Idaho
pioneered water banking on the Snake River and California
subsequently adopted water banking during the droughts of the late
1980s and early 1990s."' Generally, an agricultural user deposits its
entire or partial entitlement into a bank in return for cash, and the
water is sold to urban suppliers. Deposits are voluntary, but the
experience of California with its 2008-2009 water bank illustrates the
limits of water banks as GCC adaptive instruments.150 The state
assembled commitments for 400,000 acre-feet of water from
Sacramento Valley farmers. 51 Many farmers planned to use their
Bureau of Reclamation entitlements, but held back on planned
deposits because of the possibility that their contract deliveries would
be cut to leave water in the river to conserve an endangered fish in
the California Bay-Delta. 152
B. RUNOFF CAPTURE OR MANIPULATION
The United States has a large inventory of carry-over storage
reservoirs. More could be constructed to buffer users against GCCinduced shortages, or more water could be squeezed out of existing
reservoirs. This section explains why both these strategies are
problematic.
1. The Big Dam Era Revived?
Climate change has rekindled interest in capturing more
unallocated or regulated runoff through the construction of new
In May of 2007, Governor Arnold
storage reservoirs.
Schwartzenegger called for the construction of two new hydroelectric
dams to help meet the state's ambitious greenhouse gas emission
targets,' although the state's near bankruptcy has temporarily taken
149. History of the Water Supply Bank, IDAHO WATER REs. BD.,
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/WaterManagement/WaterRights/waterSupply/history
ofbank.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Ellen Hanak, California's Emerging Water
Market: Should Counties Play a Rol CALIFORNIA COUNTRY MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 2003,
available at http://www.ppic.org/main/commentary.asp?i=453.
150. See 2009 Drought Water Bank Overview, CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES. (Sept. 2008),
http://www.water.ca.gov/drought/docs/2009water_ bank.pdf.
151. Kate Campbell, Major Hurdles Loom for Any Water Transfers, AGALERT, Apr. 1,
2009, available at http://www.cfbf.com/agalert/index.cfm (follow Ag Alert Archives
"2009" hyperlink; then follow "Major Hurdles Loom for Any Water Transfers"
hyperlink.
152. Id.
153. Bonner R. Cohen, Global Warming Creates Need for New Dams: Schwanenegger, THE
HEARTLAND INST. (May 1, 2007), availableat
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this option off the political agenda. The runoff capture options range
from new and expanded conventional carry-over storage reservoirs, to
more environmentally friendly alternatives such as offsite storage and
the expanded conjunctive use of groundwater aquifers. For example,
to meet new demands, some cities are looking to secure future water
supplies by building off-stream storage facilities. 154 However, a return
to dam building will not be easy because the "Reclamation" or "Big
Dam Era" ended in the 1980s, and there are substantial political and
legal barriers to reviving it. 15 The political problems stem from the
loss of faith in the need for large dams.
During the first six decades of the twentieth century, the federal
government immunized the Western and (to a lesser extent) Eastern
states from most of the risks posed by climate variation. In the
twentieth century, the federal government built large-scale water
projects to backstop state water rights and prevent flood damage."1 6
Proponents of- comprehensive watershed and river basin planning
promoted the efficient (non-wasteful) use of water through multiplepurpose water projects aimed at providing widespread benefits to the
nation, or at least stimulating regional growth. The economic
assumptions behind this model were always doubtful, and for several
decades the idea that water resources development is necessary to
sustain "underdeveloped regions" such as the West or parts of the
Southeast no longer commands the widespread bipartisan political
support that it once did.
So any return to large-scale dam building, or the reoperation of
dams for more power and more consumptive water use, would
require a political and legal reversal of the past fifty years; a possible
but not yet probable scenario. Nonetheless, it is possible that GCC
could create the political will for a new era of dam building, and thus
the United States would join Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the
construction of large new projects. Any effort to build a substantial
number of carry-over storage reservoirs will face two major, related
problems, one geographical and the other legal. First, most of the
best sites for such reservoirs have been damned, or preserved as wild
and scenic rivers. This leads to the legal problem. Before GCC
passed from an unproven hypothesis to a widely accepted working
assumption, the United States was transitioning to an era of water
management characterized by the reallocation of existing supplies,
and the sustainable management and restoration of previously

http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/20949/GlobalWarmingCreatesNeed
forNewDamsSchwarzenegger.html.
154. See Tarrah Henrie, Why Some Water Districts Decided to Dam It, 7 WATER
RESOURCES IMPACT 9, 9 (2005), availableat
http://www.awra.orglimpact/issues/O511imptoc.pd
155. See, e.g., Peter M. Lavigne, Dam(n) How Times Have Changed... 29 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 451, 461-64 (2005); see also Marc P. Reisner, Deconstruction in
the Arid West: Close of the Age ofDams, 1 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
156. See Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641, 671 (1999).
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Since the 1960s, water policy has
modified aquatic ecosystems.'
evolved away from the dominant twentieth century paradigm of
multiple-purpose development. The alteration of river hydrographs is
gradually being replaced with a new, although less well articulated,
paradigm-the normative river.15 8 The goal is to use water more
sustainably and to respect rivers'. natural hydrographs within the
This view has never been
constraints of existing firm entitlements."
the
idea of multiple-purpose
as
was
fully incorporated into legislation,
into federal and
incorporated
development, but it has .been partially
Species Acts. 160
Endangered
and
Water
the
Clean
state laws such as
to protected
dams
releases
from
For example, courts have ordered
a Section 9
constitute
can
listed species, and have held that diversions
6'
taking.
Even if more money was allocated to dam building, the United
States does not have the institutional infrastructure to reverse course
quickly. When Congress allocated more federal dollars to river
restoration. projects, the two major federal dam building agencies, the
Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
responded by partially changing their missions from project
construction to "management"-which increasingly means the
restoration of stressed aquatic ecosystems."'2 The U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation has formally changed its mission from water
development to water management, and budget priorities reflect this
change."'s The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is undergoing a similar
but more complex and uneven transition and is pinning its hopes for
future survival on playing a large role in restoring the aquatic
At the current time,
ecosystems that it previously modified."

157. See W. WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 3-51 to 3-52 (1998), availableat
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1785_VL102318.pdf.
158. See A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law Reform in West Virginia: The Broader Context, 106
W. VA. L. REv. 495, 501 (2004).
159. See generally Chris Bromley, A Political and Legal Analysis of the Rise and Fall of
Western Dams and Reclamation Projects, 5 U. DEN. WATER L. REv. 204, 216-21 (2001);
Klein, supra note 156, at 648-53.
160. See Craig, supra note 4 at 829-30.
161. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 136, at 73747.
162. See PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION AND THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

(CIVIL WORKS), Feb. 11, 2005, availableat

http://www.usace.army.mil/CEMP/iis/Documents/BURREC%20USACE%2OPartnership%20FebO5.pdf
163. See BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION'S STRATEGIC PLAN: A LONG-TERM
FRAMEWORK FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 2-3

(1992); Mission Statement, BuREAU OF RECLAMATION,

http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/mission.html (last updated June 12, 2009).
164.

See Goal 2: Engineering Sustainable Water Resources, ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS,

http://www.usace.army.mil/about/campaignplan/Pages/Goal2.aspx (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010); A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modem Legal Regimefor a "Post-Modern"
United States Army Cmps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1287-88 (2004). See
generally Lavigne, supra note 155, at 461-64.
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however, the transition is incomplete. The United States has a
fragmented regulatory system that protects flows on an ad hoc
There are more problems. Dams are not environmentally
basis.'
benign. For example, dams, especially in the tropics, are methane
emitters, 166 and the up and downstream water quality impacts of
dams are largely unregulated. 6 7
Finally, the normative river's ultimate conclusion is dam removal
not construction. Many dams, especially smaller ones, have exceeded
their planned useful life or no longer perform their intended
functions. At the present time, Maine has removed some small,
marginal hydroelectric dams,168 and a dam removal program on the
Elwha River in Washington State is going forward with all deliberate
speed.16 1 More ambitious dam removal proposals include breaching
four dams on the Upper Snake River to support salmon runs in the
Columbia River basin, 170 removing O'Shaughnessy Dam north of

165. Craig, supra note 4, at 825.
166. THE WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE UNFCCC LEGAL REGIME AND DAMS 5-6-( 2000) (calls for
further study because the international climate'change regime makes no provision for
exploring the relationship between dams and climate change).
167. Initially, an influential District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision
rejected the argument that dams were point sources. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Section 401 of the Clean Water Act requires that
federal licenses obtain a state certification that the operation of the project will not
violate state water quality standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2010), but power releases
were not considered pollution discharges because nothing was added to the water.
Nat'l Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 174-75.
168. A Maine conservation organization, the Penobscot River Restoration Trust,
raised 25 million dollars to supplement a 15 million dollar federal grant to purchase
and remove two hydroelectric dams at the lower end of the river and to build a fish
run around a third. The hope is that fish will return to the watershed. The river was
once a major source of economic development as logs were floated from the
headwater forests to downstream paper mills, but much of the resulting pollution has
now been cleaned up. Katie Zezima, Maine ConservationistsReach Milestone in Plan to
Buy 3 Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at A16.
169. The efforts to remove the dam were triggered by a major Supreme Court
decision that recognized on and off reservation tribal fishing rights for several
reservations in Washington State including one reservation located downstream of
two dams on the salmon-rich Elwha River. See generally Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 679 (1979). In 1992,
Congress authorized the removal of the two dams, Elwha River Ecosystem and
Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3173, 3176 (1992), and the
federal government purchased the dams in 2000; removal is slated to start in 2012,
Christopher Dunagan, Dam Closer to Coming Down; Pricefor Removal Shoots Up, KrrSAP
SUN, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2008/feb/06/dam-closer-tocoming-down-price-for-removal-up/. The removal will be the largest removal to date,
and environmentalists are setting their sights on some of the nation's biggest dams.
170. The efforts to restore Salmon runs on the Columbia and its tributaries is an
epic tale and illustrates the role that dam removal can play in the future resolution of
such conflicts. After a court suggested that the federal government study removing
eleven dams on the Columbia and the Snake Rivers, the Clinton Administration
began a study to assess the consequences of breaching four major dams on the Snake
River. However, the Bush II Administration rejected the idea, although, a 2002 Rand
Corporation Report found that four Lower Snake River could be removed with no
disruption to the regional economy. See Kim Murphy, If Salmon Can't be Saved, Snake
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Yosemite National Park,"' and even removing the mighty Glen
Canyon Dam on the Colorado. 72
2. Reservoir Reoperation
Compared to dam building, existing reservoir reoperation is a
more likely federal GCC adaptation strategy, but fish, rather than
farmers and cities may benefit most from this adaptation. Large
blocks of water are stored in federal and state reservoirs for various
purposes. As conditions change due to GCC, reservoir operators
could alter release patterns based on new data and adjust the uses to
which the water has traditionally been put. Reservoir reoperation is
already in place; reservoir operators are altering flow release patterns
to benefit fish, not electricity consumers."' The evolution of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) jurisdiction
illustrates this development.
The Federal Power Act of 1920 authorized fifty-year renewable
licenses for private power hydroelectric projects.'7 4 As the original
licenses reached their golden anniversary, Congress amended the
Federal Power Act to partially correct the Federal Power Act's

River Dams May Have to Go, L.A. TIMES, May, 18, 2009,
http://1atimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2009/05/salmon-recovery-snake-riverdams-columbia-river-endangered-species.html; CHRISTOPHER G. PERNIN ET AL.,
GENERATING ELECTRIC POWER IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: IMPLICATIONS OF
ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 32 (2002).

171. O'Shaughnessy Dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park
supplies the city of San Francisco with water and power. The decision to build the
dam was one of the great natural resource fights of the Conservation Era and still
resonates in California. It played a major role in splitting the conservation movement
into the utilitarian, multi-use, and preservation wings. See RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR
MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF My OWN": A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 413
(1991). California environmentalists have long dreamed on restoring the valley to
John Muir's vision of it as the "flow of nature." MICHAEL P. COHEN, THE PATHLESS
See also SPRECK
WAY: JOHN MUIR AND THE AMERICAN WILDERNESS 330 (1984).
ROSEKRANS ET AL., PARADISE REGAINED: SOLUTIONS FOR RESTORING YOSEMITE'S HETCH

HETCHY VALLEY (2004) (promoting a comprehensive effort to simulate a removal
debate). In 1987, President Reagan's Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel, was
the first high-ranking official to suggest removal. Environmentalists viewed the
suggestion as a ploy to split green northern California. In 2007, the Bush II
Administration proposed a $7,000,000.00 removal feasibility study but Senator Diane
Feinstein, the former mayor of San Francisco and Hetch Hetchy defender was not
amused. See Statement of SenatorDianneFeinstein on ProposalsTo Tear Down O'Shaughnessy
Dam, U.S. SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA (May 18, 2005),

http://feinstein.senate.gov/05releases/r-hetchhetch2.htm.
172. See Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy? 19
STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 121 (2000) (addressing proposals to take down Glen Canyon Dam).
The issues dam removal raise are beyond the subject of this paper. See generally THE
HEINz CENTER, DAM REMOVAL RESEARCH: STATUS AND PROSPECTS (William L. Graf ed.,

2002).
173. See, e.g., Brian D. Richter & Gregory A. Thomas, RestoringEnvironmentalFlows by
ModifyingDam Operations,12 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y no. 1 2007 at 11-13, available at
www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll2/issl/artl2/ES-2007-2014.pdf.
174. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2010).
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The Electric
marginalization of environmental protection.17
Consumers Protection Act of 1986 requires that FERC give equal
weight to the benefits of relicensing the project and to "the
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat)." 176 Hydrorich states such as Oregon have a similar rigorous review process for
In addition, FERC's
new and re-licensed non-FERC facilities. 17
discretion was curtailed by PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology, which held that Section 401 of
the Clean Water Acts, that requires state certification that all federal
permits meet state water quality standards, includes state imposed
minimum flows for fish protection and aesthetic enhancement. 7
Section 401 certification applies to both public utilities and stateoperated hydroelectric facilities and FERC must accept the Section
401 conditions imposed by the state.so Thus, the section provides an
opportunity for environmental NGOs to impose minimum flow or
environmental flow release conditions on FERC licensees.'81 Finally,
some courts have interpreted Federal Power Act to give FERC the
authority to deny a license renewal application and to order that a
dam be decommissioned if it has become uneconomic. 182
Reservoir reoperation will often require new federal legislation,
thus exposing any reoperation plan to the vagaries of politics. Most
reservoirs, especially those run by the Corps of Engineers, are
managed according to narrow Congressional mandates which leave
the operating agency little discretion to adjust to new conditions, and

175. Id. § 797(e).
176. Id. The first case to construe the amendment held that FERC must either
prepare a comprehensive plan for the river or require permittees to evaluate the
cumulative adverse environment impacts of the project. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1986),
177. Adell Amos, Freshwater Conservation in the Context of Energy and Climate Policy:
Assessing Progress and Identifying Challenges in Oregon and the Western United States, 12 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 1, 122-31 (2008).
178. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
179. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722-23
(1994). See also, Daniel Pollak, S.D. Warren and the Erosion of Federal Preeminence in
Hydropower Regulation, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 763, 792-93 (2007) (explaining that some
subsequent cases have extended the reach of § 401).
180. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 574 U.S. 370, 373, 386 (2006)
181. See, e.g., CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.; ORDER WQ 2009-0007,
RECONSIDERATION OF WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION FOR THE RE-OPERATION OF
PYRAMID DAM FOR THE CALIFORNIA AQUEDUCT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION PROJECT No. 2426, 37-38 (2009) (ruling that license

requires state to operate project to stimulate natural flow conditions "to the extent
operationally feasible" to protect the federally listed Arroyo Toad).
182. City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 460 F. 3d 53, 74 (D.C. Cir.
006) (holding that FERC has the authority to deny a new license); see also,Jackson
Cnty. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.3d 1284, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(FERC reasonably accepted surrender of license and plan to remove dam and
powerhouse and had no power to compel transfer of license to county).
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each reservoir has a separate operating regime.'1 3 Furthermore, the
master manuals and legislation governing these reservoirs stress
predictable releases for project purposes rather than variable releases
for new consumptive and non-consumptive uses."
As an example,
the fate of an ad hoc attempt to deal with a drought in the Atlanta
area illustrates the need for fundamental reform of the laws that
control the operation of federal reservoirs if they are to be part of any
GCC adaptation strategy.
The levels in Atlanta's primary water supply reservoir dropped
during a prolonged drought, but downstream interests pressed for
releases to serve agriculture, navigation, and environmental
A federally brokered settlement among the Corps of
conservation.'
Engineers, the state of Georgia, water suppliers, and several
downstream utilities unilaterally shifted 248,858 acre feet of Lake
Lanier water to supply the Atlanta metro area."' The resulting
higher water prices would have been used to compensate the utilities
for lost generation capacity, but downstream interests successfully
A federal circuit court of appeals held
challenged the settlement.1
that the settlement violated the Water Supply Act 88 because the
statute required Congressional approval for major operation
changes.s18 The proposed reallocation was such a change because it
would constitute over twenty-two percent of the reservoir's storage
capacity, which would be the largest Corps reallocation by volume
taken without Congressional approval, and might increase to thirtyfive percent capacity in light of future growth of the region.9 0
Despite the difficulties facing legislative reform of the reoperation
of existing reservoirs, any federal legislation could reinforce the
preference for non-consumptive over consumptive uses, and thereby
strengthen potential GCC-adaptation strategies. For example, the
American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009, which died in Congress,
would have. imposed new water resource planning mandates on the
federal governments and states. 191 Federal agencies would have had
to prepare plans to increase the resiliency and the adaptive capacity of
aquatic ecosystems.
183. See NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41002, USING ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS RESERVOIRS FOR MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL
WATER SUPPLY: CURRENT ISSUES 6-7 (2010).
184. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 17090 (2000).
185. See sources cited supra,note 19.
186. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, No. 3:07-md-01, slip op. at 56 (M.D. Fla.
July 17, 2009).
187. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
188. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2010).
189. Se. Fed. Power.Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
190. Id. at 1324.
191. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 216, 453
(2009).
192. Id. § 477.
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C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Federal preemption is another possible adaptation strategy both
to construct new reservoirs and to reoperate existing ones. Most
seasoned observers of western water politics would rate this foreveroff any political agenda. Legendary New Mexico State Engineer Steve
Reynolds, once said that the 1922 Colorado River Compact would be
renegotiated when "pigs fly."'" Despite this, Professor Robert Adler
bravely asserts that there is a case for rethinking the third rail of
western water politics.' 9 4 He argues that-the traditional deference to
state water law is based on the assumption that states can best manage
the resources within their borders, and GCC erodes this
Regional water shortages can raise. national issues
assumption."
such as food shortages, .and these shortages will intensify interstate
conflicts. Thus, there will be pressure to intervene more directly in
interstate water disputes through oversight of interstate markets, to
revive dam building, 6 and perhaps even to put large scale wet-dry
region water transfers, which came to an end in 1968 with the passage
of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 1 back on the agenda. In that
same year, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington State banned all
planning for Columbia River -Southwest transfers for ten years as the
price for his support of the Central Arizona Project and transfers of
this scale have not been on the agenda since that time.198 For
example, in 2008, Congress consented to the Great lakes and St.
Lawrence Basin Compact, which makes it almost impossible to
transfer water outside the Great Lakes Basin. 99 It is more likely that
federal intervention will occur indirectly, but the option is now on the
table.
IV. WATER CONSERVATION
Water conservation is an important GCC adaptation strategy that

193. Comment from Steve Reynolds, state engineer of New Mexico, to Dan
Tarlock, at the Colorado River Working Symposium (May 23-26, 1983) (on file with
author). See generally NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUE FOR THE

NExT CENTURY (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986)
194. Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4-8 (2010).
.195. Id. at 31-32.

196. Id. at 55- 56.
197. See generally Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and
Sustainable Water Use: If There Are No "NaturalLimits," Should We Worry About Water
Supplies?, 27 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 33, 44-45 (2006).
198. See Charles Coate, "The Biggest Water Fight in American History ":Stewart Udall and
the Central Arizona Project, 37 J. Sw. 79, 93 (1995); NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 331 (1973) (recommending that interstate, interbasin

transfers be subject to compensation for losses suffered in the area of- origin -a
constraint that will chill most proposals).
199. There is a very limited exception for "straddling cities." Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, §§ 4.8-4.9, 122 Stat.
3739, 3752-753 (2008).
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has long been on the water-use reform agenda because more water
for human consumption and environmental protection can be
generated at relatively low costs compared to dam construction by
changes in agricultural and urban use patterns and technologies. For
urban users, water suppliers can either mandate or induce individual
users to use less water. The options include long term strategies such
as marginal rather than average cost pricing and the promotion of
xeriscaping,20 0 as well as short-term use bans. Agricultural water
conservation includes more efficient irrigation technology, short or
long term land retirement, and less subsidized water pricing.
However, conservation has been difficult in the West because of the
perverse incentives created by prior appropriation, and there has
been little incentive to practice it in the East.
In the West, there has long been a tension between the beneficial
use rule, which penalizes the wasteful use of water, and the "use-it-orlose-it" aspect of prior appropriation.201 The former encourages the
use of the maximum, continuous amount of water possible given the
technology of the use. "Use-it-or-lose-it" potentially chills conservation
because the amount of the right may be permanently reduced. States
have adopted a variety of legislation to reduce this tension, and
increasingly judicial decisions encourage conservation.20 2 However,
conservation efforts have generally been ad hoc and have not been
This section examines two
tied to any measurable targets.
The first is
conservation initiatives which push the envelope.
California's recent legislation that sets statewide water use reduction
targets for both agricultural and urban users. The second is a
growing cluster of state legislation and judicial decisions that require
cities to base water supply decisions on realistic demand and
availability projections. This legislation, modest as it is, along with
GCC -has rekindled a long running debate about the type of
settlement appropriate for water-stressed regions and may help push
arid areas toward more GCC appropriate settlement, vegetation and
water use choices.
200. For example, Austin, Texas evolved from offering rebates to individual
homeowners to mandatory standards for commercial buildings. Tony T. Gregg, Dan
Strub & Drema Gross, Water Efficiency in Austin, -Texas, 1983- 2005: An Historical
Perspective, 99 J. AM. WATER WORKS Ass'N. 76, 78 (2007), available at
http://www.awwa.org/publications/AWWAJournalArticle.cfm?itemnumber-5127&s
howLogin=N. Xeriscaping is also a common element of municipal climate action
plans. See, e.g., GEN. PLAN ADVISORY COMM. (GPAC) CLIMATE ACTION PLAN SUBCOMM.,
available at
CARLOS CLIMATE AcrION PLAN 36 (2009),
CITY OF SAN
http://www.cityofsancarlos.org/generalplanupdate/whats newJclimate-action pla
n.adopted.asp.
201. Frick Farm Props. v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 216 P.3d 170, 175, 181 (Kan. 2009)
(taking advantage of nature's bounty and switching to non-irrigated crops may result
in a finding of abandonment through non-use).
202. E.g., State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash.2d 459, 475 (1993)
(consistency with local custom not sole measure of beneficial use); Kazan (In re Estate
of Steed) v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1992) (noting
that downstream user has no resource against upstream user who switched from
flood to pressurized sprinkler irrigation).
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A. CALIFORNIA GETS SEMI-SERIOUS ABouT CONSERVATION
California's most recent efforts to "balance" the sustainability of
the fragile Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ecosystem with the water
demands of the San Joaquin Valley and southern California include
the first statewide water conservation targets. In 2009, the state
legislature passed Senate Bill One (SB1) which creates a highly
structured science-based planning process and parallel stakeholder
and consultation processes, and potentially contains many major
changes in future water use.203 Agricultural and urban conservation
are key components of the new ecosystem-consumption balance
strategy.204 The legislation sets a target of a twenty percent per capita
reduction in urban water use by 2020.0 Urban water suppliers must
develop use targets to meet the 2020 goal. 0 They can be met from a
menu which includes: an eighty percent reduction in the supplier's
baseline per capita use; residential and landscaping performance
standards; the use of ninety-five percent of a hydrologic region's
Water Conservation Plan target; or methods development by the
Department of Water Resources which take into account, inter alia,
climatic differences, population density, regional plant water needs
and any community hardships that result from the measures.20 7
However, customers already connected to an existing water supply
system on anuary 1, 2010, cannot be compelled to install new
equipment. 0 8
Agricultural users, including Central Valley Project suppliers,
must, inter alia; (1) accurately measure the volume of delivered water,
(2) adopt a pricing structure "based at least in part on quantity
delivered, (3) facilitate alternative uses for lands with high water
duties, and (4) facilitate the use of recycled water. 209 They must also
prepare agricultural water management plans tailored to their service
areas.2 0 For decades economists have urged that suppliers move
from subsidized and/or average cost pricing to marginal cost
pricing.2 1' California's legislation mandates a pricing structure that

203. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act portion of the legislation,
section 85000 et seq. codifies many of the previous goals and action
recommendations developed during the now defunct Bay-Delta Process. CAL. EPA,
DEVELOPMENT

OF FLOW

CRITERIA

FOR THE

SACRAMENTO-SAN

JOAQUIN

DELTA

ECOSYSTEM (DRAFr) 1, 10 (2010). Section 29702 adopts a policy of reduced reliance
on the Delta to meet the state's future water needs. Anne E. Melley, Pollution and
ConservationLaws, 50 CAL.JuRIs. 3D § 455 (2010). See generally Ellen Hanak et al., Myths
of California Water- Implications and Reality, 16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 3
(2010).
204. Hanak, supranote 203, at 25.
205. S.B. No. 7 § 10608.16 (Cal. 2009).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 10608.16.
208. Id. § 10608.26(d).
209. Id. § 10608.48.
210. Id. § 10826.
211. E.g., James E.T. Moncur & Yu-Si Fok, Water Pricing and Cost Data: Getting the
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moves in this direction by encouraging: (1) more efficient farm use,
(2) the conjunctive use of groundwater, (3) the reduction of problem
drainage, and (4) the adjustment of prices to seasonable conditions.2 12
B. TYING URBAN GROWTH-TO AVAILABLE SUPPLIES
As supplies shrink, changed land use and water use patterns can
be important elements of GCC adaptation. For example, higher
densities and more green space for recharge might make limited
supplies stretch farther. A report by American Rivers and other water
and environmental non-governmental organizations, documents how
urban sprawl reduces aquifer recharge by paving over recharge
areas.2 13 An important first step in planning for GCC is linking water
supply and land use planning. For decades, water, municipal, and
public utility law have not provided incentives for cities to link water
and growth. Water and land use planners have worked at different
levels of government with little reason to talk to one another,214 and
cities have long operated on the assumption that, as water suppliers,
they had a legal duty to anticipate future growth and assemble the
necessary supplies to accommodate this growth.1
Not only was there no incentive for cities to ask hard questions
about how much growth a region's water balance might support, it
was assumed illegal to even ask the question because water suppliers
had a duty to accommodate unlimited growth. Water law supported
the notion that the only option was to accommodate market driven
growth because public utility law, 1 the common law of riparian
rights, prior appropriation, and the law of groundwater capture
combine to create a de facto "super preference" for growth
accommodation. 2 17 To take one example, western courts developed
doctrines to allow western cities to acquire and hold water rights for

Right Numbers, 92 J. CONTEMP. WATER RESOURCES EDUC, 35, 35-37 (1993).
212. S.B. No. 7 § 10608.48(c)(4) (Cal. 2009).
213. AM. RIVERS ET AL., Paving Our Way to Water Shortages: How Sprawl Aggravates the
Effects of Drought 1 (2002), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/waterandsprawl.html;
see also Sid Perkins, Paved Paradise: Impervious Surfaces Affect a Region's Hydrology,
Ecosystems-Even Its Climate, 166 SOc'Y. FOR SCI. & PUB. 152, 152 (2004) available at
http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040904/bob8.asp.
214. The historic disconnect between water and land use planning is explored in A.
Dan Tarlock & Lora A. Lucero, ConnectingLand, Water, and Growth, 34 URB. LAw. 971,
972-73 (2002); see generally Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban
Growth in New Mexico: Same Old, Same Old, Or a New Era?, 43 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 803, 804
(2003).
215. Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 146 P. 640, 646 (Cal. 1915).
216. See Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable
Water Use: If There Are No "NaturalLimits, 'Should We Worry About Water Supplies?, 27 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 33, 54, 58 (2006).
217. See A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and
Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W. Nw. J. ENVrL. L. &
POL'Y 173 (1999); A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law's Potential
But Limited Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD
WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE 73-81 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed. 2005).
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anticipated growth by largely exempting them from the central
antimonopoly principle of prior appropriation: water rights cannot be
The progressive growth2 9 and
held for speculative purposes.
2
20
growing cities doctrines
allow a city to perfect a water right to the
they
will need to meet reasonably anticipated
amount of water that
future growth.
Several recent developments make it impossible for cities to
ignore the link between adequate water supplies and land use
development. 221 The water budgets for most rapidly growing areas
are relatively fixed, and thus growth can only come at the expense of
GCC only reinforces the need to
reallocating existing supplies."
ensure that existing and future residents have secure supplies of
water. In light of regional GCC impact projections, there should be
greater integration of local water supply demands to the watershed of
origin, and for greater adaptation cooperation among water supply
agencies. 2 States have at least five options to link water and land use
policies: (1) continuing unlimited growth accommodation; (2) capping
growth; (3) shifting the burden of supply acquisition to local
governments and developers; (4) adopting aggressive, technological,
and managerial water conservation initiatives such as information
provision, xeriscaping requirements, marginal cost pricing,
desalinization and the use of greywater;22 and (5) constraining
growth to match available and projected supplies. The first option is
still the de facto preferred option; the second is seldom considered or
used, 2 but the last three options are being implemented in various

218. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37-38 (Colo.
1996).
219. E.g., id.; City & Cnty. of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d
992, 997 (Colo. 1954); City & Cnty of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (Colo.
1939). See also Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 654 P.2d 537, 540 (N.M. 1982); Wash.
Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1257-58 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting); Janis E. Carpenter, Water for Growing Communities: Refining Tradition in the
Pacific Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 127, 127 (1997); Malcolm Lindsey, Legal Problems in City
Water Supply, 22 ROCKY MNTN. L. REV. 356, 356 (1950); Dennis J. Herman, Sometimes
There's Nothing Left to Give: The Justificationfor Denying Water Service to New Customers to
Control Growth, 44 STAN. L. REv.-429, 431 (1992).
220. E.g., St. Onge v. Blakeley, 245 P. 532, 539 (Mont. 1926); N.M. ex rel. State Eng'r
v. Crider, 431 P.2d 45, 48-49 (N.M. 1967).
221. See, e.g., WESTERN GOVERNORS' Ass'N, WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIES FOR A
SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE:
NExT
STEPS
2-3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/pdf ocwp/WGAwater08.pdf.
222. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 153 (2007).
223. See Patricia Mulroy, Diving in the Deep End: Help Water Agencies Address Climate
Change, in OPPORTUNITY 08 (Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 18, 2008, at 8, 12
availableat
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0207_climate-change-mulroy-opp08.aspx.
224. See James Flanigan, Keeping Water Pure is Suddenly in Demand, N.Y. TIMES, June
2008,
19,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/business/smallbusiness/19edge.html.
(noting that California has plans for 16 new desalination plants).
225. An influential Florida case found a growth cap imposed by a wealthy coastal
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areas around the West and elsewhere.
1. Judicial Change
Courts have a limited but important role to play in strengthening
the link in addition to enforcing linkage legislation. Recent judicial
cases encourage a greater linkage between land use and water supply
planning.
Decisions in Colorado,2 2 6 Hawaii, 227 and Washington
22
State ' have shown some willingness to apply anti-speculative and the
community arbitrary. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 157
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). But see City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d
1332, 1334-1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding a 3,000-unit density cap for
small strip of land on the Atlantic coastline); Home Builders Ass'n v. Cape Cod
Comm'n, 808 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 2004) (ruling that a building permit cap was
valid to protect the sole source aquifer for a town on Cape Cod); cf In re Bay-Delta
Programmatic Envd. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184 P.3d 709, 721
(Cal. 2008) (illustrating a failed attempt to put issues such as climate change and
growth limits into the planning mix). In a challenge to the Bay Delta programmatic
EIA, an intermediate appellate court remanded the assessment because "CALFED
appears not to have considered, as an alternative, smaller water exports from the BayDelta region which might, in turn, lead to smaller population growth due to the
unavailability of water to support such growth." Id. This alternative had been
considered in the early stages of the process but the use of water markets and land
retirement was quickly rejected because any serious consideration of them
exacerbated rather than reduced the ecosystem conservation-water supply conflicts
that CALFED was formed to address. The California Supreme Court held that the
final PEIS/R justified the exclusion of export restrictions because it would
compromise the objective of water supply. Id. at 725.
226. See Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307,
313 (Colo. 2007).
227. Hawaii has applied the public trust doctrine to subordinate municipal claims
to instream flow needs. See generally In re Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 174 P.3d 320, 329
(Haw. 2007); In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 691-92 (Haw. 2004); In re
Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000). See also David L. Callies &
Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use, and the Environment, 30 U. HAw L.
Rev. 49, 94 (2007) (criticizing the decisions for giving a strong but not absolute
preference to non-economic uses of water and reducing, "nearly to the point of
extinction" private water rights). But see Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting-to Climate
Change: The PotentialRole of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781,
838-40 (2010) (noting that public trust doctrine supports adaptation to climate
change and the Hawaii Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the doctrine's
evolutionary and adaptive potential).
228. Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Wash.
1998);WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3) (2003) (beneficial use rather than capacity of a
private municipal water system is the measure of the water right rather than the
physical capacity of the system). However, the legislature reversed the decision, and
the state now requires that municipal suppliers develop plans with new conservation
standards and take actions that are consistent with local land use plans its service
area. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.386 (2004). The legislation was challenged as a
violation of separation of powers and due process. Transcript of Proceedings,
Lummi Nation v. Washington, NO. 06-2-40103-4SEA, (Wash. Super. Ct. June 11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rights/Images/pdf/muni/LUMMI0611 .pdf.
In June, 2008, a Washington state trail court agreed that the legislature had overreached its constitutional power. Id. at 13. In his oral opinion, Judge Jim Rodgers
ruled that the legislature had enacted "retroactive statutes that unconstitutionally
attempt to reinstate water rights that were invalidated [in Theodoratus]" because a
legislature cannot redetermine adjudicative facts. Id. at 7. The most significant part
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public trust doctrines to municipal water supply planning to require
more accurate urban need projections and to modify public utility law
to allow new land-water supply linkage. The Colorado Supreme
Court has gone the farthest in tightening the standards for future
municipal water right claims and requiring the incorporation of GCC
scenarios. It twice rejected an application from a small city in
southwestern Colorado for a conditional water right because the city
had not adequately demonstrated a need for the water.22' A water
court awarded two small districts serving Pagosa Springs a conditional
water right for 29,000 acre feet, and return flows, of water with the
right to continuously refill a reservoir based on a one hundred-year
planning horizon.23 o In Pagosa I, the Supreme Court, per Justice
Hobbs, remanded the decision because of the water court's failure to
make sufficient findings concerning the area's future growth
Justice Hobbs reasoned that municipalities' statutory
projections.2
exemption from the need to have a vested legal interest in the lands
served does not immunize governmental water supply agencies from
the state's anti-speculative doctrines. 3 Cities must have considerable
latitude to plan for future growth, but a supplier must still
demonstrate three elements to make a non-speculative appropriation:
(1) a "reasonable water supply planning period"; (2) the ":substantial
population projections" based on a normal growth rate for the
planning period; and (3) the amount of available unappropriated
water that is reasonably necessary for the reasonably anticipated
governmental needs for the planning period, above its current
supply 2 33 Governmental applicants must also demonstrate that it will
put the water to actual beneficial use within a reasonable period of
time.

On remand, the Water Court declined to take new evidence and
instead entered a new proposed degree awarding the District 23,500
acre feet of storage rights and reduced the planning horizon to
2055.3 The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the Water Court
properly reduced the planning horizon to 2055 but held that the
District had still not carried its burden to show they had a nonof the ruling was that legislature's extension of municipal water supply status to those
serving fifteen or more units also violated the state's separation of powers doctrine
because it was an attempt to overrule Theodoratus retroactively. See id. at 12-13. See
generallyJeff B. Kray, Municipal Water Law: Washington's Landmark Law Faces Challenges,
at
available
2007,
Oct.
7
1,
REPORT
WATER
44
http://www.thewaterreport.com/Issues%2041%20to%2044.html.
229. PagosaArea (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d at 318; Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v.
Trout Unlimited (Pagosall), 219 P.3d 774, 781 (Colo. 2009).
230. Pagosa I, 170 P.3d at 309.
231. Id. at 309-10.
232. Id. at 315 (citing City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo.
1996)).
233. Id. at 309-10.
234. Id. at 310.
235. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (PagosaII), 219 P.3d
774, 776-77 (Colo. 2009).
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speculative intent to put the water to beneficial use given the wide
variation in area population projections between the District's
projections and a state study."' The city argued that the municipal
conditional water appropriations are legislative or quasi-legislative acts
immune from judicial review, 3' but the court rejected the
Although the case may be limited to smaller cities with
argument.'
unrealistic growth projections, but it serves as warning to all cities that
they must provide reliable growth projections to justify new water
rights applications for future need.
Courts in California and other states have modified the duty to
serve rule to allow cities to subordinate utility service to land use
decisions. 2 40 The duty to serve rests on basic principles of fairness
and estoppel, and it was designed primarily to protect those who had
entered into a service relationship with a common carrier or were
within the service area of a public utility but were denied service when
the carrier or the utility was able or should have been able to provide
service. 24 There is no need to make public water and sewer suppliers
serve poorly cited or premature growth. Recent decisions recognize
that cities need the discretion to defer development until the
necessary water services are in place.242 Cities also have the power to
deny subdivision approvals for new subdivisions with water and sewer
service that are inconsistent with a county's land use plan.

236. Id. at 785.
237. Id. at 788.
238. Id.
239. For an alarmist reading of the case which suggests that Pagosa I and Pagosa H
may be creating future Mesa Verdes see Casey S. Funk & Daniel J. Arnold, Pagosa-The
Great and Growing Cities Doctrine Imperiled: An Objective Look From a Biased Perspective, 13
U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 283, 318-319 (2010).
240. See infra note 255.
241. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable
Water Use: If There Are No "NaturalLimits" Should We Wony About Water Supplies? 27 PUB.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 58-59 (2006).
242. See Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258, 266 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983); Moore v. City Council of Harrodsburg, 105 S.W. 926, 926 (Ky. 1907)
("In the absence of fraud, corruption, or arbitrary action, the judgment of the city
officials as to [extension of water service] is beyond judicial control.").
243. In Serpa v. County of Washoe, 901 P.2d 690, 691-92 (Nev. 1995), the court held
that Washoe County (Reno) can prohibit five acre or less subdivisions "until a new
water source is available," and the county's action did not impair state water rights
because the power to define rational growth "includes the ability of a county
government to determine water availability for itself." Schofield v. Spokane County, 980
P.2d 277, 281 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) holds that a county has the power to deny
rezoning for riparian land because no central sewer system existed to serve the
proposed ranchettes. A state order to a financially strapped city to improve its
antiquated sewage system was sufficient reason to terminate previously
extraterritorial service in City of Attalla v. Dean Sausage Co., 889 So.2d 559, 571 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2003). See also State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 928 N.E.2d 706, 712 (Ohio,
2010) (no taking when city refused to extend sewer service because municipalities not
obligated to construct sewers).
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2. Legislation
The most important GCC adaptation development is legislation
that imposes duties on cities and developers to guarantee residents
reliable, long term, drought "resistant" supplies. These "show me"
statues do not fundamentally challenge the idea that climate and
water balances should not be a limit on growth. Arizona and
California now view the existence of an adequate, long-term, droughtproof supply of water as an urban consumer entitlement.24 4 The
statutes inform public water suppliers and major developers that
water supply assessments can no longer be based on hydrologically
Instead, they must be
weak assumptions about supply availability.
be available under
will
water
what
based on realistic assessments of
caused by
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serious
include
which
worst-case conditions,
246
protection
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They will -increasingly produce water supply assessments that expose
the long risks of supply interruption, and Will force some areas to take
more aggressive steps to balance growth with supply.
Arizona enacted its statute as part of the price for construction of
the federally-funded Central Arizona Project. 24 8 The state had to
agree to stop mining its aquifers to support urban growth and in 1980
adopted the Groundwater Management Act. 24 9 The Act imposes a
duty on all new developments in the four groundwater basins
included within the designated Active Management Areas (AMAs) to
establish "that an applicant will have sufficient supplies of water that
The rules have a
will be continuously available for 100 years ."2
a municipal race
off
set
number of major weaknesses. They initially
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to address the problem of subdivisions
person can now request that a public or private water supplier,
including those using surface or Colorado River water, outside of an

244. Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 241, at 62.
245. Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 241, at 65.
246. Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 241, at 65.
247. Lincoln L. Davies, just a Big, "HotFuss"?Assessingthe Value of ConnectingSuburban
Sprawl, Land Use, and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1217,
1231-32 (2007).
248. ARIz. MuN. WATER USERs Ass'N, WATER POLICY RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE
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(2010) 2 0 2 available
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10.pdf
http://www.amwua.org/pdfs/Final%20Combined%20Files%20for%
249. Id.
250. ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § R12-15-717(A) (2010).
251. See Susanna Eden et al., Agricultural Water to Municipal Use 58 WATER REPORT 9,
12-13 (2008), availableat https://cals.arizona.edu/azwater/files/finalathchapter4.pdf.
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AMA to "provide a written statement describing the water supply
status of real property within the service area. "252
California's assured water supply statute grew out of a "green"
water supply agency's refusal to extend service to a new development,
outside its service area.15' The law only applies to developments over
500 units and certain industrial facilities.
The legislation defines a
sufficient supply as the total supply available during "normal, singledry, and multiple-dry years within a 20-year projection."2 5
To
calculate this, the supplier must include a number of contingencies
such as the availability of water from water supply projects, "federal,
state, and local water initiatives such as CALFED, and water
conservation.2
Water suppliers must prepare Urban Water
Management plans. 5
Subsequent water supply assessments must
either be consistent with these plans or meet the available water
supply criteria and may trigger a duty to acquire additional water
supplies.258
These duties will be enforced primarily under the California
Environmental Quality Act .5 Courts have shown a willingness to
invalidate "unrealistic" supply projections,2 60 and cities are starting to
deny or delay development permits.'
Remanding impact

CODE § 45-108.06.
253. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, How CaliforniaLocal Governments Became Both Water
Suppliers and Planners,4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENvTL. L.J. 7, 23-25 (2010).
254. Id. at 24.
255. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66473.7(a)(2) (West 2009).
256. Id. § 66473.7(a)(2)(D). CALFED is a partnership of 25 California State and
Federal government agencies.
257. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10910(c) (West 2010).
258. Id. § 10911.
259. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15155 (2007).
260. See Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cordova, 150 P.3d 709, 720-21 (Cal. 2007). See also Santa. Clarita Org. for Planning
the Env't v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 457-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); In
re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 184 P.3d
707, 726-27 (Cal. 2008) (challenging the programmatic impact statement for the Bay
Delta because it failed to identify a specific source of water to protect the quality of
the Delta environment and reaffirming the duty to identify the sources of specific
supply for site-specific projects (although the court held that the EIR's region by
region analysis of potential sources was sufficient for a programmatic analysis which
allowed for tiering and distinguished the Bay-Delta programmatic EIR from the site
specific EIR in Vineyard)).
261. ProposedInland Empire DistributionCenter Delayed Due to Potentially Inadequate Water
Supply, LEGAL NEWS: ENvrtL. STORMWATER (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chicago, Ill.), Feb.
1,
2008,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.foley.com/publications/
pub.detail.aspx?pubid=4742 ("The Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) has
decided to delay approval of a water supply assessment for the proposed Skechers
U.S.A., Inc., distribution facility in Rancho Belago in the Inland Empire because it
could not promise to deliver water to serve the proposed development."). See also
MONTEREY PENINSULA
WATER MGNT.
DIST. BD, MPWMD APPLICATION No.
20080915MBS-L4, ADOPTION OF FINDINGS OF DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO AMEND
CALIFORNIA
AMERICAN
WATER
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM,
(2009),
http://www.mpwmd.dst.ca.us/asd/board/boardpacket/2009/20090326/14/iteml4.
htm (denying permit for ninety acre feet per year to serve ecoresort because State
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assessments for better documentation and analysis will not, in and of
itself, promote GCC adaptation. However, it is a short step from
requiring a more realistic assessment of available water supplies to
requiring that municipalities factor the increased risks likely to result
from climate change and to display the range of adaptation strategies
And that precedent already exists.
that they are considering.
California and other states are already factoring these into state water
planning and water project operation scenarios, and this is now a
legal duty. A Fish and Wildlife Service Biological Opinion for
California Bay Delta Smelt was invalidated, in part, because the
Service based the opinion on the continuation of historic flow
patterns rather than reduced ones caused by-climate change.6
Colorado followed the lead of Arizona and California with a more
modest linkage law. Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-20-30 1,263 adopted in 2008,
conditions the approval of new residential developments on a finding
that the developer has secured an adequate water supply.26 4 The duty
is triggered by a development, which includes a new water use for
"fifty single-family equivalents, or fewer, as determined by the local
An adequate supply is defined as one that is
government. "26'
sufficient for the build-out of the proposed development, including
"reasonable conservation measures and water demand management
to account for hydrologic variability."266 This definition, however, is
broad enough to include a reasonable range of global climate change
scenarios. A developer who proposes to supply the development
itself must submit a detailed report from a professional engineer or
water supply expert that identifies, inter alia, the physical source of
supply and estimated yield "under various hydrologic conditions. "267
If a water supply entity will furnish the water, a shorter letter by a
professional engineer or water supply expert will suffice.2 6 1 It is
unlikely that Colorado courts will play a significant role in enforcing
the statute. The legislature has attempted to immunize adequacy
Water Resources Control Board order required that proposed source of supply, a
well near the Monterey River, would have to be shut down during high flow season to
maximum basin storage for dry season.).
262. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-1207 OWW TAG, 2007
WL 1623826, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007). See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Climate
Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 825, 825-26
(2008).
263. COLO. REv. STAT. § 29-20-301 (2008).
264. Id. § 29-20-303(1). The approval can be attached to the standard land use
instruments, rezonings, planned unit development approvals, conditional uses and
subdivision maps, at either the preliminary or final approval stage. Id. § 29-20-103(1).
Local governments get only one bite at the apple unless water demands or supply
materially change during the approval process. Id. § 29-20-303(1). Cf Moss v. Cnty.
of Humboldt, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 428, 443-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring
supplemental environmental review to analyze project's impact on water shortages
downstream).
265. COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-103(1) (2008).
266. Id. § 29-20-302(1).
267. Id. § 29-20-304(1).
268. Id. § 29-30-304(2).
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decisions from judicial review and to limit the burden on permit
Approval is based on the local government's "sole
applicants.
discretion," and the record is limited to the previously mentioned
reports and letters and whether the developer has paid the necessary
fees to the water supplier. 2 69 The local government also has the
discretion to ask for other information that it deems relevant 270
Linkage laws exist in other states and municipalities. Florida's
concurrency legislation requires that comprehensive land use plans
have a water supply element,2 7 ' and local governments cannot issue
certificates of occupancy without an adequate water supply in place.27
Wonderfully dry Santa Fe, New Mexico has gone further and has
adopted an urban water balance account, in which future growth is
limited to the maintenance of the balance,2 7 ' and is coming close to
making water availability the primary determinant of growth. 7 The
city first restricted new water connections outside city limits unless
the customer had a valid, preexisting agreement for water service.
Next, the city's Water Budget Administrative Ordinance, enacted in
2003, required all new projects within the city to offset a project's
water budget by retrofitting existing toilets with high-efficiency
units.276 The 2005 Water Rights Transfer Ordinance requires new
large construction projects to transfer water rights to the city prior to
issuing building permits. 277
VI. CONCLUSION
In addition to untested legal regimes, efforts to address GCC
must confront many barriers. The most significant of these is the
growing gap between what a vast majority of the scientific community
believes is happening and must be done, and public opinion. In the
United States, support for climate change action began to ebb in 2009
as skepticism about its occurrence began to increase 27' Even though
a majority of Americans believe that climate change is a -serious
problem, the percentage of those who see it as a very serious problem
is the third lowest in the world; only China and Russia report lower

269. Id. § 29-30-305(1).
270. Id. § 29-30-305(1)(d).
271. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(13) (2010).
272. Id. § 163.3180(2)(a). See also Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard
Hamann, Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REv. 403, 448-55
(2009).
273. Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 217, at 65.
274. See Kyle Harwood, The Evolution of Wet Growth Regulations: City of Santa Fe, 7
WATER RESOURCES IMPACT 1, 5 (2005).
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Barry G. Rabe & Christopher P. Borick, The Climate of Belief American Public
Opinion on Climate Change, ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUDIES (Brookings Inst., Wash.,
D.C.), Jan. 2010, at 2-7, availableat http://wvw.brookings.edu/~/media/
Files/rc/papers/2010/01_climaterabeborick/01_climate_rabe borick.pdf.
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poll numbers.2 79 This feeds into the next barrier. To address climate
change, actions must be taken that take effect, if ever, far in the
future, but the general population and politicians can only effectively
concentrate on the very short term.280 As the late Prime Minister of
England, Harold Wilson, said: "A week is a long time in politics."'
These two factors, combined with intense resistance by large sectors
of the hydrocarbon energy industry, have led to the complete failure
of any national mitigation program. This failure puts the entire
burden on adaptation, but the question arises: Will these factors also
stymie effective adaptation? The lessons of addressing sustainable
development, both positive and negative, are instructive.
In the late 1990s, sustainable development emerged as a possible
fundamental principle of environmental law. Despite the principle's
ambiguity, Professor J.B. Ruhl arred that it would evolve into hard
law through a seven-step process.2 2 Its emergence as widely accepted
norm would ultimately make opposition untenable. Who would
openly advocate unsustainable development? At this point, nonaction would no longer be tenable and would be seen as a "significant
Governments would next establish the norm as a
deficiency. "28'
policy goal and begin to apply it to prohibit unsustainable actions.284
The final stage would be the emergence of "measurable, rationalized,
routine" legal standards. 8 ' GCC presents more complex evolutionary
problems because all policy responses are science-driven to a greater
extent than sustainable development, which is hybrid ethicaleconomic construct. 286 Still, it is possible to posit an analogous
progression from the articulation of the scientific case for action, an
intense period of denial and debate, to the triumph of the scientific
imperative of adaptation that leads to a widespread public demand, or
at least acceptance of the need, for effective action. At this point,
adaptation strategies and duties would be incorporated into water
planning first as an additional justification for an action and then as

279. WORLD BANK, PUBLIc ATTITUDES TOwARD CLIMATE CHANGE: FINDINGS FROM A
MULTI-COUNTRY POLL 52 (2010), availableat
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/CCPollReportJuly
01_2010.pdf.
280. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future,94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1173-79 (2009).
281.. See, e.g., Daniel Tarschys, Time Horizons in Budgeting, 2 OECDJ. BUDGETING 77,
78 (2002) availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataocd/1/42/43506311.pdf
282. J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Environmental
Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
273, 277-93 (1998).
283. Id. at 283.
284. Id. at 284-85.
285. Id. at 289-90.
286. Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological justice and Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
SUSTAINABILITY 129, 150 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006) ("The
famous Brundtland definition contains two ethical elements that are widely accepted
as being essential to the idea of sustainable development: concern for the poor ...
and concern for the future .... ).
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hard stand-alone duties. A long period of experimentation and
evaluation would follow as new scientific evidence developed. During
this period, new climate change-driven water law rules might emerge.
The lesson of sustainable development illustrates that the path to
this objective will be twisty and rocky. At the federal level, sustainable
development has stalled at the level where it is mentioned but seldom
However, the idea has taken root in many
actually applied.28 7
lower levels of government, especially
industries, services, and
municipalities. 8 With respect to water and GCC adaptation, it has
proven harder to move to the no-tenable-opposition stage. The
general mitigation debate cannot seem to leave the denial and debate
stage, but this stasis may not impact adaptation because the water
community, especially in the West, seems to have accepted the idea
that GCC will impact water, that these impacts will often be negative,
and thus some response is necessary. Water officials, planners, users,
and NGOs are including possible climate change scenarios in a variety
of state and local plans. The federal water agencies such as the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers are considerin
the -impact of climate change on the operation of their projects. 28
GCC is also increasingly being cited as an additional justification for
The question now is, what is
legislation 9 and judicial decisions.
have the technical capability
not
we
do
the next stage? At this point,
scales relevant to
geographical
the
small
to make firm forecasts at

287. See ENVTL. LAw INST., AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 15 (John Dernbach
ed., 2009) ("[T]he United States is not on the verge of actually becoming
sustainable.").
288. See Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Governance and Sustainability: Major Progress,
Significant Challenges, in AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43, 43 (John
Dernbach ed., 2009); Ira Robert Feldman, Business and Industry: Transitioning to
Sustainability, in AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 71, 71 (John Dernbach ed.,
2009).
289. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 95029503, 146 Stat. 1, 342 (requiring that the Bureau of Reclamation assess the projected
climate change impacts on eight Reclamation functions in eight major river basins in
which the Bureau operates). Id. §§ 9506, 9508 (requiring the Bureau to describe the
risks on its water delivery and management functions posed by global climate change
by 2011 and to submit a comprehensive national water availability assessment report
to Congress by 2012). Id. § 9507 (requiring the United States Geological Survey to
implement an enhanced stream flow measurement system incorporating the
suggestions of a 2004 National Research Council White Paper). See generally NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER SCIENCE AT THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 106-08 (2007)
availableat, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/l1773.html.
290. See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L.
110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) (approving an interstate compact among the eight
Great Lakes basin states, which makes it extremely difficult to divert water outside the
basin). See also A. Dan Tarlock, The Internationaljoint Commission and Great Lakes
Diversions: Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1671, 1688-89 (2008) (stating one of the justifications for the Compact offered in an
influential International Joint Commission was that projected climate change-induced
lake level fluctuations counseled against disturbing the status quo).
291. Climate change supports the need for the accurate. municipal growth
projections that form the basis for conditional appropriations. See Pagosa Area Water
& Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 316 (Colo. 2007)
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Until water
water managers, although projects are getting finer."9
managers and users can make more accurate projects, we will remain
in the "low hanging fruit" stage.. Climate change will be used as an
additional justification for actions that conserve water, support
aquatic ecosystem maintenance, or support more water efficient
growth patterns.
As the negative impacts of GCC begin to kick in, water law is
likely to move in two inconsistent directions depending on the
geographical and political context of the dispute. The first direction
is more litigation. Courts will be asked to revisit many fundamental
doctrines of water law as they grapple with challenges to the status
quo. The second direction is more out-of-the-box solutions that
involve consensual modifications of existing doctrines.29
It is
premature to predict the balance between legislative and judicial
responses to the pressures of adaptation, but none of the elements
identified in this survey of the common law of riparian and prior
appropriation are insurmountable barriers to GCC adaptation. Since
it emerged as a discrete area of law in the second half of the
nineteenth century, water use patterns have substantially changed.
Water law has, albeit imperfectly, been able to adapt to these changes
or has. not blocked the necessary legislative and negotiated
adjustments.

292. See, e.g., EvaluatingSustainability of Projected Water Demands in 2050 Under Climate
Change
Scenarios,
GIS
&
Sd.
(July
21,
2010,
12:43
PM),
http://gisandscience.com/2010/07/21/evaluating-sustainability-of-projected-water(discussing a recent Natural
demands-in-2050-under-climate-change-scenarios/
Resources Defense Council study which predicts that one-third of all counties in the
lower 48 states will face higher risks of water shortages by mid-century as the result of
global warming and some 400 of these counties will face extremely high risks of water
shortages).
293. See David H. Getches & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law and Management: An
Urbanizing and Greener West Copes with New Challenges, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL
RESOURCEs LAW AND PoLIcY 316-17 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds.,
2010).

